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ABSTRACT

The thesis explores the path of ratified human rights treaties in the Egyptian legal system. Although these
treaties have the force of law, as mandated by the constitution, the examination of court practice in Egypt
shows plenty of cases where the ratified treaties have been judicially discarded due to the conflict with
domestic laws or the inconsistency with the rulings of Shari’a law. The thesis examines the judicial
phenomenon of overthrowing ratified human rights treaties under the Egyptian constitutional provisions. In
order to grasp the foundation of this phenomenon, the thesis studies the rules which regulate the formulation
of reservations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Egypt’s position towards the application
of international law on the domestic level, and the interpretation of Shari’a law. The thesis presents three
examples of cases where the conflict between ratified human rights treaties, domestic laws, and Shari’a law
reservations arise. The thesis demonstrates how the courts’ judgments resolved the conflict, and that the
resolution upheld the application of domestic law and overthrew the ratified human rights treaties. Whereas
the discussed judgements were made under the former constitutions, the paper investigates the judicial
application of ratified human rights treaties under the provisions of the Constitution of 2014. The paper
analyzes the novel provisions introduced to the Constitution of 2014 which are related to the application of
human rights treaties. Based on these provisions, the paper argues that the constitution of 2014 opens the door
for further judicial application of ratified human rights treaties.
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I.

Introduction

Egypt is an active signatory state to human rights instruments.1 It was among the first to sign and ratify
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).2 In addition to Egypt’s international obligation to adhere
to the standards prescribed therein, these instruments are binding legal instruments on the domestic
level. The Egyptian Constitution confers the force of law on ratified international instruments which
have been signed, ratified, and published in the Official Gazette.3 As a result, those instruments are to
be judicially applied akin to laws.
Nevertheless, numerous laws and judicial practices in Egypt contradict the provisions of the ratified
human rights instruments.4 This contradiction constitutes a legal difficulty for domestic courts. The
difficulty arises when a provision of a ratified human rights instrument is invoked against the
application of a non-compliant law.5 In this situation, the court is presented with two inconsistent legal
instruments, namely: the enacted law and the ratified instrument which possesses the force of law. The
Egyptian Constitution does not resolve this contradiction; likewise, the judicial practice towards the
resolution of this contradiction is not uniform.
Moreover, Egypt has abundantly formulated Shari’a law reservation to ratified human rights
instruments. By virtue of these reservations, the provisions of a ratified instrument cease to apply when
they are inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law. The permissibility of such reservations is a
debatable question under the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT); the latter
disallows reservations which defeat the object and purpose of the instrument. Shari’a law allegedly
defeats the object and purpose due to its breadth and multiplicity which can be relied on to strike down
any provision of the ratified instrument.6 However, the paper is rather concerned with the difficulty of

The paper uses the word “instruments” to refer to international human rights treaties, conventions, agreements,
protocols, and covenants. A list of Human rights treaties to which Egypt is a signatory state is available at The Human
Rights Library of the University of Minnesota, http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/research/ratification-egypt.html (last visited at
April 2018). The United Nations Human Rights. Office of the High Commissioner (OHCR),
2
See Id.
3
The second Section of Chapter II examines the legal authority of ratified treaties on the domestic level. See II.B. The
signature, ratification, and publication dates of the ICESCR, the ICCPR, and the CEDAW are outlined in Chapter III, See
III.
4
In Chapter III, three cases of contradiction are presented, namely: prohibition of apostasy versus freedom of religion,
the prohibition of labour strike and the ICESCR, and gender discriminatory penal provisions and CEDAW.
5
The paper uses the term (non-compliant law) to refer to domestic laws which are inconsistent with the ratified human
rights instruments.
6
The third Section of Chapter II elaborates on the multiplicity and breadth of the rulings of Shari’a law. See II.C.
1

the “competent court”7 to assess the compatibility of the invoked instrument and the rulings of Shari’a
law. This difficulty stems from the massive jurisprudence of Islamic religion that encompasses
dissimilar and sometimes contradictory views.8 Although the Egyptian Supreme Constitutional Court
(SCC) has articulated an interpretation of Shari’a law which is confined to the rulings of absolute
authenticity and meaning,9 the judicial practice of the Egyptian Administrative Court shows a clear
deviation from this interpretation. Due to this inconsistency in the judicial practice, the court’s
discretion in individualistically interpreting Shari’a law is unavoidable.
The interpretation of Shari’a law plays a crucial role in the resolution of the tension between ratified
human rights instruments and laws. i.e. if the articulated interpretation disallows the invoked provision
of the ratified instrument, the instrument’s application should be halted by virtue of Shari’a law
reservation formulated thereto.
Due to these difficulties, various ratified human rights instruments have been “judicially assassinated”
in Egypt.10 For example, the Egyptian Administrative Court found that Shari’a law prohibits the
practice of labour strikes, and thus halted the application of the ICESCR’s obligation to guarantee the
legality of labour strike. Likewise, it rejected the notarization of conversion from Islam based on
Shari’a prohibition of apostasy in spite of the freedom of religion as prescribed in the ICCPR.11
This paper coins the term “trilemma” to describe the situation when a ratified human rights instrument
is invoked against the application of a non-compliant law, and where that instrument embodies a
Shari’a law reservation. This situation symbolizes a trilemma because the competent court should
address its attention to three different paths: the application of non-compliant law, the legal authority
of ratified human rights instruments, and the interpretation of the Shari’a law reservation.
The legal tension between ratified human rights instruments and non-compliant laws is expected to
escalate under the present Constitution.12 Before 2014, the domestic enforcement of ratified
instruments was solely regulated by Article 151 of the Constitution which vests the force of law over
instruments which have been signed, ratified and published in the Official Gazette. 13 Based on that
The paper uses the term “competent court” to refer to the domestic court before which a ratified treaty is invoked
against the application of a non-compliant law.
8
The multiplicity and diversity of the Islamic jurisprudence is the subject of the third section of Chapter II.
9
With reference to the second Article of the Constitution that designates the rulings of Shari’a law as the main source of
legislation. Supra note 6.
10
Supra note 4.
11
The judgements made in these cases are detailed under Chapter III. SeeIII.
12
Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt [Egypt], 18 January 2014, available at:
http://www.refworld.org/docId/3ae6b5368.html [accessed 21 February 2018]
13
Supra note 3.
7
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Article, the SCC held that ratified instruments and laws possess equal legal force; thus, the application
of either instrument over the other is not a constitutional violation. As a result, the application of noncompliant laws over ratified human rights instruments was not recorded as a constitutional violation.
However, The Constitution of 2014 added Article 93 as a distinct provision for the enforcement of
ratified human rights instruments. The Article confers the force of law over ratified human rights
instruments and binds the state with these instruments.
This paper argues that the ratified human rights instruments should supersede non-compliant laws
under the Constitution of 2014. The argument is chiefly premised on the novel provision of Article 93
of the Constitution of 2014. The paper also argues that the competent court should cite the
interpretation of Shari’a law as articulated by the SCC in resolving the tension between ratified human
rights instruments and Shari’a law reservations.
Chapter II introduces the relevant legal foundations that create the legal tension between ratified
human rights instruments, non-compliant laws, and the interpretation of Shari’a law. The Chapter
embodies three sections: (I) The first section explores the permissibility of reservation according to
the rules of the VCLT. (II) The following section elaborates on the legal force of ratified instruments
in Egypt. The section outlines the legal framework of the enforcement of ratified instruments and
demonstrates the judicial practice thereof. (III) The last section focuses on the difficulty of interpreting
Shari’a law reservation; it discusses the breadth and multiplicity of the jurisprudence in the Islamic
religion and presents the interpretation of Shari’a law as articulated by the SCC.
Chapter III provides three examples of cases where the trilemma arises: (I) The first section deals with
the judicial contention to notarize conversion from Islam versus freedom of religion as prescribed in
the ICCPR. (II) The second section focuses on the legal prohibition of labour strikes versus the right
to strike as dictated by the ICESCR. (III) the last section addresses the discriminatory character of
penal provisions against CEDAW’s obligation to repeal any penal discriminatory provision. In the
three discussed examples, the interpretation of Shari’a law brings about crucial effect on the resolution
of the tension between the ratified human rights instrument and the non-compliant law.
Chapter IV is the cornerstone of this paper. It provides a legal methodology for the resolution of the
trilemma. The Chapter presents two main arguments: firstly, the application of ratified human rights
instruments should supersede any non-compliant law based on the interpretation of the novel provision
of Article 93 of the Constitution of 2014; secondly, the competent court should not use its discretion
in interpreting Shari’a law reservation; rather, it should cite the interpretation of Shari’a law as

3

articulated by the SCC. Based on these two arguments, Chapter V concludes the paper by suggesting
that the resolution of the tension between ratified human rights instruments and laws as well as Shari’a
law reservation should no longer constitute a difficulty to the competent court under the constitutional
provisions of 2014.

4

II.

Background

Prior to delving into the details of the legal trilemma that arises among (i) the application of noncompliant laws, (ii) the legal authority of ratified human rights instruments, and (iii) the interpretation
of Shari’a law reservations formulated to those instruments, the paper briefly demonstrates their
respective legal foundations.
The Chapter begins by elaborating on the legal framework of the reservation principle enshrined in the
VCLT; it then explores Egypt’s constitutional stance regarding the application of ratified human rights
instruments; finally, it discusses the difficulty of interpreting Shari’a law reservations in a judicial
context.
A.

The Legal Framework of Reservations to International Treaties

This section explores the rules regulating the formulation of reservations to international treaties. The
first subsection elaborates on the historical development of the rules regulating reservations prior to
the enactment of the VCLT in 1969. The second subsection briefly explains the impermissibility of
reservations according to the provisions of the VCLT and focuses on the impermissibility of
reservations which are incompatible with the object and purpose of the reserved treaty.
1.

The Historical Progression of Reservations to International Treaties

The rules governing the admissibility of reservations to international treaties have greatly changed
since the nineteenth century.14 At that time, the admissibility of reservations was decided by the
“unanimity doctrine.”15 The doctrine regards international treaties as contractual instruments subject
to the rules of contract law; thus, a reservation made by a state party required a tacit or express
acceptance by all other state parties.16 In case one or more objections were raised, the reservation
would not bear any legal effect over the treaty, and the reserving state could make the choice between
either becoming a party to the treaty without the proposed reservation, or not becoming a party at all.

14

OLIVER DORR & KIRSTEN SCHMALENBACH, VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY. Page 242.
15
See Id.
16
As voiced in the Advisory Opinion Concerning Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide: “To this principle was linked the notion of integrity of the Convention as adopted, a notion
which, in its traditional concept, involved the proposition that no reservation was valid unless it was accepted by all
contracting parties.” Reservation to the convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, ICJ
Reports 1951, p 15, Para. 21.
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Although the unanimity doctrine paved the way for a smooth interpretation and application of treaties,
it decreased the number of state signatories to multilateral treaties.17
As result, in 1951 and with relation to reservations formulated by numerous states to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,18 the General Assembly requested an
advisory opinion from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the validity of reservations. 19 In
response to that request, the ICJ rejected the traditional unanimity doctrine and introduced the notion
of the compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty as the determining factor for the validity
of reservations.20 Despite the lack of endorsement from the International Law Committee (ILC)21, the
General Assembly adopted the flexible framework to reservations as pronounced by the ICJ,22 and
eventually incorporated it into the VCLT with minute modifications.23
2.

Reservations under the VCLT

As defined in Article 2 lit d of the VCLT, a reservation is “a unilateral statement, however phrased or
named, made by a State, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding a treaty, whereby
it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions to the treaty in their application
to that State.”24 The framework stipulated for reservations under the VCLT has been a controversial
discussion in the academic arena of international law as well as among international lawyers.25 Article
19 approves state liberty to formulate any reservations;26 however, it restricts such liberty in three

17

OLIVIER CORTEN & PIERRE KLEIN, THE VIENNA CONVENTIONS ON THE LAW OF TREATIES: A
COMMENTARY. THE EVENTFUL HISTORY OF THE PROVISIONS RELATING TO RESERVATIONS. Page 409.
18
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Adopted by the General Assembly of the.
United Nations on 9 December 1948. (https://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%2078/volume-78-i-1021english.pdf).
19
UNGA (United Nations General Assembly) Resolution 478 (V). (http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5.htm).
20
Supra note 16
21
ILC Yearbook, 1950, Vol 1, 53 meeting, page 90.
(http://legal.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/english/ilc_1950_v1.pdf)
22
See General Assembly, Official Documents, 17th session, Sixth Commission, 736th to 744th meetings (A/C.6/SR.73644) PP 13- 56 and A/5287, para 24. See also Supra note 17 at 415.
23
Supra note 17 at 415.
24
As defined in Article 2 lit (d) of VCL. United Nations, Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 23 May 1969,
United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1155, p. 331, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docId/3ae6b3a10.html [accessed
18 February 2018]
25
“The subject of reservations to multilateral treaties is one of unusual – in fact baffling – complexity and it would serve
no useful purpose to simplify artificially an inherently complex problem.” Sir Hersch Lauterpacht, Report on the Law of
Treaties, Doc. A/CN.4/63, Yrbk ILC (1953), II, at 124. Likewise, Paul Reuter claimed that “the question of reservations
has always been a thorny and controversial issue, and even the provisions of the [1969] Vienna Convention may not have
eliminated all these difficulties”. Tenth Report, A/CV.4/341 vol. II, Part One, P 56.
(http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_341.pdf&lang=EFS)
26
ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE. RESERVATION GENERALLY NOT
PROHIBITED. Page 121
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cases: (i) If the treaty itself does not permit any state party to formulate reservations, Article 19 lit a;27
(ii) If the treaty only permits certain reservations among which the formulated reservation is not
included, Article 19 lit b;28 and (iii) If the formulated reservation is incompatible with the object and
purpose of the treaty, Article 19 lit c.29
Whereas the application of Article 19 lit a and lit b can be ascertained through an evident treaty clause
that stipulates the explicit or implicit prohibition of reservations, the application of Article 19 lit c
raises some perplexing questions. The Article does not provide a defining criterion of the content of
the object and purpose of the treaty, nor does it design a proper methodology to test the compatibility
between this notion and the formulated reservation. More importantly, although the VCLT has
imposed certain limitations on state’s liberty to formulate reservations, it is mute on creating a
competent authority empowered to decide on the permissibility of reservations, nor does it specify the
legal consequences of formulating an impermissible reservation.30 Within the uncertainty and
vagueness of this regime, state practice towards reservations has been the subject of several theoretical
and practical questions.31
The following sub-sections elaborate the previous attempts by the ILC to elucidate the object and
purpose of the treaty, explores the permissibility of reservations to human rights treaties, and discusses
the permissibility of vague and general reservations.
a)

The Enigma: The Notion of the Object and Purpose of the Treaty32

The notion of the object and purpose was coined in the ICJ Advisory Opinion of 1951 as the validity
pivot of reservations.33 It was introduced as a means to strike balance between the collective interest
of protecting the essence of the treaty and the individualistic desire for each state to tailor the treaty
obligations as per its national interests. Nevertheless, due to the silence of the VCLT on defining the
terms of Article 19 lit c and the implications of formulating an impermissible reservation, many
scholars have expressed their struggle with their attempts to grasp the scope of application of the
For example, the 1998 Rome status of the International Criminal Court. Article 120 states “No reservations may be
made to this Statute”. (https://www.icc-cpi.int/nr/rdonlyres/ea9aeff7-5752-4f84-be940a655eb30e16/0/rome_statute_english.pdf)
28
An example of a treaty which only permits certain reservation to be formulated is the United Nations Convention
Relating to the Status of Refuges. Paragraph 1 of Article 42 states “At the time of signature, ratification or accession, any
State may make reservations to articles of the Convention other than to articles 1, 3, 4, 16(i), 33, 36-46 inclusive.”
29
As stated by Article 19 of VCLT. Supra note 24
30
Supra note 26. Page 129
31
The ILC has presented 17 reports on treaty reservation on an attempt to allay the vagueness of VCLT framework to
reservation.
32
The term "enigma” is inspired from the authors Isabelle Buffard & Karl Zemanek. The “Object and Purpose” of a
Treaty: An Enigma? (http://fulltext.calis.edu.cn/kluwer/pdf/13851306/3/233264.pdf)
33
Supra note 16
27
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Article. Lijnzaad pointed out the difficulty of the notion by suggesting that “the claim that a particular
reservation is contrary to object and purpose is easier made than substantiated.”34 Reuter described the
ambiguity of the notion “as uncertain as when it first appeared in the Court’s Advisory Opinion of
1951.”35 In response to this ambiguity, the ILC has theorized in its Draft Guidelines that “the object
and purpose of the treaty means the essential provisions of the treaty, which constitute its “raison
d'être.”36 The ILC elucidated this finding in the Draft Guideline 3.1.6 stating:
The object and purpose of the treaty is to be determined in good faith,
taking account of the terms of the treaty in their context. Recourse may
also be had in particular to the title of the treaty, the preparatory work of
the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion and, where
appropriate, the subsequent practice agreed upon by the parties.37
It is worth noting that in spite of the ILC attempts to diminish the ambiguity of Article 19 lit c, the
confusion arising out of it remains intact. The emphasis of the question has shifted from defining the
object and purpose of the treaty to determining the essential clauses of the treaty and its “raison
d'être.”38
b)

Reservations to Human Rights Treaties

It could be argued that the concept of reservation is ill-fitted to deal with human rights instruments
because of their non-reciprocal nature.39 Reservations bear a consequential effect on the obligations
and privileges created by treaties. As a result, state parties cautiously examine the formulated
reservations in reciprocal treaties. Conversely, with relation to human rights instruments, states are
less concerned with the formulated reservations. The reason for this lies in the characteristic
dissimilarity of reciprocal treaties to human rights instruments. Whereas the former is modeled as a
state-state agreement, the latter is a state- individual agreement. In other words, the benefits of
reciprocal treaties are exchanged between/among its signatory states while the beneficiary of human
rights instruments is a citizen committed to the legal regime of the signatory state, who gets an
undertaking from the state party that the domestic laws will be mitigated to become in compliance
with the standards prescribed in the ratified human rights instrument. As a result, reservations in human

34

L. Lijnzaad. Reservations to UN-Human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin? Page 82-3.
Reuter, Introduction to The Law of Treaties. Page 82.
36
Draft Guideline 3.1.5. Supra note 14 page 264.
37
Supra note 14 page 265.
38
Supra note 36.
39
Supra note 14 page 267.
35
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rights instruments are of a different nature than reciprocal treaties in terms of their formulation,
admissibility, and application.40
Furthermore, the object and purpose of the human rights instruments steers the discourse towards the
impermissibility of any reservations to these instruments. One can argue that the object and purpose
of human rights instruments is to create legally binding standards for human rights with which
signatory states should comply with. This argument has been pronounced in the Human Rights
Committee Report in its General Comment No.24 with relations to reservations formulated to the
ICCPR.41 To a similar effect, the ILC drafted the Guideline 3.1.12 on reservations to human rights
instruments in which it suggested that a reservation to a human right instrument should not annihilate
any of the fundamental rights and privileges embodied in the treaty.42
c)

Vague and General Reservations: Shari’a Law Reservations

In addition to the complexity of the legal framework to reservations, state practice has revealed the
formulation of reservations which are of a vague and general character. The shortcoming of these
reservations lies in the difficulty of defining the scope of their application. These reservations are
unclear, and their contexts are undefined. As a result, the compatibility test between such reservations
and the object and purpose of the reserved instrument is farfetched. State practice shows that these
reservations have been abundantly formulated. For example, the reservation made by the United States
of America to the Genocide Convention stating that: “Nothing in the convention requires or authorizes
legislation or other action by the United States of America prohibited by the constitution of the United

40

Kasey L. McCall-Smith claimed the impressibility of reservations to human rights treaties because of the nonreciprocal nature of human rights treaties stating “It is generally accepted that the law of treaties is premised on
reciprocal contractual relationships between State Parties. However, because human rights treaties embody obligations
towards individuals, whose well-being is the responsibility of the state, rather than obligations between State Parties,
there has been a general apathy by states in their duty to guard the integrity of these instruments.” Kasey L. McCallSmith, Mind the Gaps: The ILC Guide to Practice on Reservations to Human Rights Treaties, 16 Int'l Comm. L. Rev.
263, 305 (2014) Page 274.
41
UN Human Rights Committee (HRC), Report of the Human Rights Committee (Volume I), 3 October 1995, available
at: http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/50/plenary/a50-40.htm [accessed 20 February 2018]. “In an instrument which
articulates very many civil and political rights, each of the many articles, and indeed their interplay, secures the
objectives of the Covenant. The object and purpose of the Covenant is to create legally binding standards for human
rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally
binding for those States which ratify; and to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations
undertaken.”
42
See the text of the Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2007 Volume II Part Two, A/62/10, 2007, chap. IV,
Page 32-33. available at: http://legal.un.org/docs/?path=../ilc/reports/2007/english/chp4.pdf&lang=EFSRAC [accessed 20
February 2018] “[t]o assess the compatibility of a reservation with the object and purpose of a general treaty for the
protection of human rights, account should be taken of the indivisibility, interdependence and interrelatedness of the
rights set out in the treaty as well as the importance that the right or provision which is the subject of the reservation has
within the general thrust of the treaty, and the gravity of the impact the reservation has upon it.”
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States as interpreted by the United States.”43 and the reservation formulated by Malaysia to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child accepting a number of provisions “only if they are in conformity
with the Constitution, national laws and national policies of the Government of Malaysia.”44
The ILC responded to the formulation of vague reservations with Draft Guideline no. 3.5.2 stating
that: “A reservation shall be worded in such a way as to allow its meaning to be understood, in order
to assess in particular its compatibility with the object and purpose of the treaty”.45 The ILC relied on
the definition of reservation as articulated in Article 2 lit d of VCLT as it excludes or modifies “the
legal effects of certain provisions of the treaty in their application.”46 With this being said, “across the
board reservations”47 inherently violate Article 19 of the VCLT because their legal effect is not
confined to “certain provisions” of the instrument.
Moreover, the Report of the Human Rights Committee has pointed out the inadequacy of the vague
and general reservations by stating that:
Reservations must be specific and transparent, so that the Committee,
those under the jurisdiction of the reserving State and other States parties
may be clear as to what obligations of human rights compliance have or
have not been undertaken. Reservations may thus not be general, but
must refer to a particular provision of the Covenant and indicate in
precise terms its scope in relation thereto.48
A Shari’a law reservation is classified under vague and general reservations.49 Since Shari’a law does
not have a monolithic clerical authority, it is not a coherently unified system of rules.50 Rather, it is an
abundance of juristic and scholarly views which happen to be contradictory and, sometimes,
paradoxical.51 An example of these reservation is the one formulated by Mauritania to the CEDAW
stating that it accepts the convention “in each and every one of its parts which are not contrary to
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Islamic Sharia and are in accordance with our Constitution.”52 In fact, most Muslim countries have
invoked Shari’a law as a reservation to CEDAW.53 The shortcoming in these reservations is the
difficulty of defining their scope and testing their compatibility with the object and purpose of the
reserved treaty, as asserted by the ILC: “it is the impossibility of assessing the compatibility of such
reservations with the object and purpose of the treaty, and not the certainty that they are incompatible,
which makes them fall within the purview of Article 19 (c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.”54
In sum, Shari’a law reservations are depicted as to being of vague and general character. This
vagueness obfuscates the scope of their application and makes, for those who are concerned with the
application of the instrument, the compatibility test with the object and purpose of the treaty
unachievable; thus, makes them inconsistent with the rules of VCLT.
B.

The Judicial Enforcement of Ratified International instruments in Egypt

Domestic laws regulate the relationships between individuals and govern any conflict arising among
individuals and the administrative apparatus. International law is more concerned with the states’
relations.55 However, such distinction is, as described by Shaw, “overly simplistic.”56 Although it
might appear that both international law and the domestic law are two separate legal system, several
tricky questions arise out of the relationship between these two legal systems. For instance, in the event
that a rule of international law is invoked as a defense before a domestic court, to what extent is the
domestic court legally obliged to recognize and apply such a rule? The question gets more perplexing
when there is an evident contradiction between domestic laws and rules of international law; in that
case, the application of one rule necessarily defeats the other.
The question of the relationship between international law and domestic law is to be answered in the
light of the theories of dualism and monism.57 Whereas dualist states regard international law as an
independent legal system which only applies domestically if it is backed up by enforceable national
legislation, monist regimes incorporate international law into their domestic legal system. The
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difference between these two regimes is an ongoing discourse in the scholarship of international law;
however, this discourse goes beyond the focus of this paper. The paper is rather focused on the
enforcement of human rights instruments in Egypt as stipulated by the constitutional provisions.
In this section, Egypt’s position regarding the legal enforcement of international treaties is explained.
The first subsection explores the constitutional provisions regulating the authority of ratified
instruments with more focus on human rights instruments. The second subsection explores the power
of the SCC to review the legality of reservation formulated to ratified instruments. The third subsection
the explicates the judicial practice towards the enforcement of human rights instruments in Egypt.
1.

The Constitutional Provisions on the Authority of International Instruments

Egypt incorporates ratified international instruments to its domestic legal system. This is exemplified
by Article 151 of the Constitution of 1971 stating that: “the President of the Republic shall conclude
treaties and communicate them to the People’s Assembly, accompanied with suitable clarifications.
They shall have the force of law after their conclusion, ratification, and publication according to the
established procedure.”58 The same provision has been incorporated in the Constitution of 2012 under
Article145 stating that: "The President of the Republic represents the state in its foreign relations. He
concludes treaties. Once both chambers agree to the treaties, they are considered ratified. Once issued,
these treaties have the force of law, in accordance with agreed-upon rule.”59 The position is confirmed
in the present Constitution of 2014 under Article 151 reading: “The President of the Republic shall
represent the State in its foreign relations and conclude treaties and ratify them after the approval of
the House of Representatives. Such treaties shall acquire the force of law following their publication
in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.”60
Therefore, Egypt is a monist state; however, the domestic enforceability of ratified international
instruments is not absolute. The fulfillment of some formal requirements is a prerequisite for the legal
enforcement of these instruments. Based on the mentioned Article, the ratified instruments are only
enforceable after their parliamentary approval and publication in the Official Gazette. Therefore,
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signed instruments which have neither been approved by the parliament nor published in the Official
Gazette do not possess any legal authority on the domestic level.61
In addition to Article 151, the enforcement of human rights instruments was emphasized in The
Constitution of 2014; Article 93 states: “The State shall be bound by the international human rights
agreements, covenants and conventions ratified by Egypt, and which shall have the force of law after
publication in accordance with the prescribed conditions.”62
Although both Article 151 and Article 93 regulate the enforcement of international treaties and human
rights instruments respectively, their content is not identical. First, the scope of application of Article
151 applies to all types of international treaties whereas Article 93 is only confined to human rights
instruments. Second, the formal requirement of the parliamentary approval is not explicitly stipulated
for the enforcement of human rights instruments in Article 93. Third, and most importantly, both
Articles vest the force of law in ratified treaties, but Article 93 creates an obligation over “the state”63
to be bound by ratified human rights instruments.
2.

The Legal Nature of Ratified Instruments in the Egyptian legal System

As explained in the previous subsection, ratified instruments possess the force of law as mandated by
the constitution; however, an important question regarding the legal nature of ratified instruments may
arise. As an elaboration, if the SCC is entitled to review the constitutionality of laws and regulation,
to what extent can the SCC review the legality of the ratified instruments? The question becomes more
perplexing when it is related to the power of the SCC to review the legality of the formulated
reservation to a valid ratified instrument. This subsection deals with this question. The first part
explains the legal nature of ratified instruments; the second explores the power of the SCC to invalidate
the whole treaty; and the last part investigates the power of the SCC to invalidate reservations
formulated to the ratified instrument.
a)

Ratified Instruments are Sovereign Acts

Ratified international instruments are considered sovereign acts and are subject to no judicial
examination. The decision to ratify an international instrument is a political decision undertaken by
the competent body of the state; however, this decision results in a legal effect since the ratified
61
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instrument will become an enforceable instrument on the domestic level. Due to the political
considerations involved with the state’s decision to ratify a treaty, it is considered as a sovereign act.
Domestic courts do not have the jurisdiction to examine sovereign acts. This can be seen in Article 17
of the Judicial Authority Law no 64. Year 1972 which reads: “courts may not directly or indirectly
examine sovereign acts.”64 To a similar effect, Article 11 of State Council Law no. 74. Year 1972
which read: “The circuits of the State Council shall not review any requests pertaining to sovereign
acts.”65
The SCC has recognized the political nature of ratifying treaties and characterized it as sovereign acts;
and thereby, excluded it from the jurisdiction of the judiciary in multiple precedents.66
b)

The Power of the SCC to Review Ratified Instruments

In spite of the finding of the last part, the SCC may invalidate the ratification of an international
instruments upon the non-fulfillment of the formal requirements of the constitution. As an elaboration,
the constitution mandates the force of law over international instruments which have been signed,
ratified, and published in the Official Gazette; in case one of these formal requirements is not met, the
SCC is entitled to decide whether the instrument possesses the force or not on the domestic court.
However, the merits of the ratified instrument represent the substance of the act of sovereignty; as a
result, the SCC does not have the jurisdiction to review the legality of the substance of the treaty.67
c)

The Power of the SCC to Invalidate a Reservation

It could be argued that the decision to formulate a reservation is subject to the judicial reviewal of the
SCC. The latter is entitled to invalidate the domestic effect of reservations which are impermissible
under the rules of the VCLT.68 Such an argument can be predicated on the monism of the Egyptian
legal system; Since Egypt has signed the VCLT, it has become part of the domestic law which is
enforceable. As a consequence, the formulation of reservations should be enacted in accordance with
the rules of the VCLT not only because of its force on the international level, but also because of its
force on the domestic level. Therefore, the state is bound to comply with the rules of the VCLT when
formulating a reservation to an international instrument.
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Based on that theorization, one can argue that the SCC is entitled to invalidate reservation which are
formulated in violation to rules of the VCLT. Nevertheless, three main implications oppose the power
court to do so, namely: (i) it would be legally difficult to draw a distinction between the sovereign
nature of ratifying a treaty and formulating a reservation. In this regard, it could be argued that the
formulation of the reservation is an indispensable act to the ratification of the instrument. As a result,
the formulation of the reservation is also a sovereign act which courts are incompetent to examine. (ii)
Egypt signed the VCLT in 1982. If, arguendo, based on the theorized argument that the SCC has the
power to review the legality of formulated reservations, such argument would only apply to reservation
formulated in a later date to 1982 because law should not apply retroactively. (iii) Egypt has not ratified
the VCLT. Although Egypt has accessed to the Convention in 1982, it has not been yet either ratified
or published in the Official Gazette; as a result, the VCLT has not fulfilled the constitutional criteria
required for conferring the force of law upon it on the domestic level.
3.

The Judicial Practice

Based on the constitutional provisions on the enforcement of the ratified instruments, court rulings
recognized the authority of these instruments and enforced them. For example, The Court of Cassation
found that: “Whereas the Covenant entered into between the governments of Egypt and Sudan was
ratified by the Council of Nizars on 17 May 1902 and published in the Official Gazette, therefore it is
one of the laws of the state…”69 The Court of Cassation further ruled that Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations of 1961 has become an integral part of the domestic laws based on Egypt’s
ratification and publication to that Convention.70
In a famous judgment ruled by the Court of High State Security in 1987, the court detected the
discrepancy between (i) Article 124 of the Egyptian Penal Code (EPC)71 which criminalizes civil
servants’ striking and (ii) the ICESCR which confirms the legality of labor strike.72 The Court found
that, based on the rule of “lex posterior derogat legi priori,”73 the Covenant overruled Article 124. The
Court premised its finding based on the following reasoning:
The right to strike involves a group of employees refusing to temporarily
conduct their work chores as an arrangement to reach a joint interest. In
69
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reviewing the ICESCR against Article 124 of EPC, we detect an evident
contradiction. In order to dismiss this contradiction, we should identify
which rule supersedes the other; in other words, evaluating the legal
force of EPC versus the ICESCR.
In doing so, an important question is raised: why should be the judiciary
obliged to apply the provisions of international treaties? In answering
this question, we confirm that international treaties are to be applied by
the Egyptian judiciary not because it is merely an international
obligation that the government accepted towards the international
community, rather as an integral part of the domestic laws of the
country.
Based on the first paragraph of Article 151 of the Egyptian Constitution
of 1971 which states the following “The President of ……”74 As the
Covenant imposes certain standards that are related to the state
sovereignty, it was admitted by The People’s Assembly and published
by virtue of the Presidential Decree No. 537 in 1981 which was
published in 14th Edition of the Official Gazette on April 8, 1981.
Hence, the Covenant became an integral part of domestic laws by virtue
of Article 151 of the Constitution.
Since the Covenant was signed, ratified, and published in a subsequent
date to the enactment of EPC, Article 124 is superseded. Based on the
second Article of the Egyptian Civil Code which conditions for the
repealing of an existing provision of law that a new subsequent law
includes a contradicting provision of law.
As a consequence, Article 124 is no longer in force and the legislator
ought to regulate the practice of the labor right to strike.75
In addition to the judicial practice on the enforcement of international instruments, the Egyptian
judiciary has also shown recognition to customary international law.76 This can be observed in Opinion
No.583 dated August 19th, 1961 of the General Assembly of the Legal Opinion and Legislation
Departments of the State Council.77 This Opinion concluded that the established practice in
international law is “enforceable in the territory of the state whether or not internal legislation
mandating its enforcement has been passed.”78 To a similar effect, The Court of Cassation recognized
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international customary rules and found that foreign diplomats may not be forced to testify before
national courts.79
In sum, Egypt is a monist state i.e. the domestic legal system accommodates the ratified instruments
according to the conditions prescribed in the Constitution. Moreover, the Constitution of 2014 has
reinforced the application of human rights instruments. The position of the Egyptian judiciary has
validated the constitutional approach through showing recognition and enforcement to ratified
international instruments.
C.

The Difficulty of Interpreting Shari’a Law Reservations

As explained in the first section of this Chapter, a reservation bears a legal consequence on the treaty
as “it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions to the treaty in their
application to that State.”80 As a result, the application of the treaty provisions, with relation to the
reserving state, is restricted insofar as the reservation is formulated.81 Muslim states have shown a
tendency to formulate Shari’a law reservations to human rights instruments. In some cases, such
reservations are formulated to one or more provision of the treaty; in other cases, the reservation is
“across the board.”82 For example, Egypt has formulated an “across the board” reservation to the
ICESCR declaring that: “[t]aking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Sharia and the fact
that they do not conflict with the text annexed to the instrument, we accept, support and ratify it.”83
Likewise, Saudi Arabia reserved the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) stating that: “[t]he Government of Saudi Arabia declares that it will
implement the provisions of the above Convention, providing these do not conflict with the precepts
of the Islamic Shariah.”84 Bahrain formulated a reservation to ICCPR stating that: “[t]he Government
of the Kingdom of Bahrain interprets the Provisions of Article 3, (18) and (23) as not affecting in any
way the prescriptions of the Islamic Shariah.”85 The state of Libya formulated a reservation to the
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) stating that it: “ratifies the Convention
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and interprets Article 25 (a) thereof, concerning the provision of health-care services without
discrimination on the basis of disability, in a manner that does not contravene the Islamic sharia and
national legislation.”86
In these examples, the domestic application of the reserved provision of the instrument is to be ceased
if found to be inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law. In cases of “across the board” reservations,
any inconsistent provision with the rulings of Shari’a law should be judicially discarded. Egypt, as a
monist state, vests in ratified international instruments the legal force of law.87 As a result, those
instruments should be applied by domestic courts akin to laws; however, if any treaty embodies a
Shari’a law reservation, the application of the provisions should be judicially rejected where found
inconsistent with the rules of Shari’a law. As a result, the competent court should apply a compatibility
test between the reserved treaty and the rulings of Shari’a law and halt the application of any
inconsistent provision with such rulings. However, this test is confounded by the indeterminacy of
Shari’a law as a system of rules.
This section focuses on the difficulty of interpreting Shari’a law reservations in a legal sense. The first
subsection highlights the difficulty of articulating a monolithic definition of Shari’a law due to the
breadth of the Islamic jurisprudence. The second subsection draws upon guidance from the SCC
judgements with regards to the interpretation of Shari’a law.
1.

What is Shari’a law?

The term “Shari’a law” subtly triggers multiple denotations and dissimilar connotations. It is the
draconic regime which promotes violence against non-believers and applies cruel punishments to
whoever disobeys it, and/or the misogynistic system of rules that strongly suppresses women and
privileges men. Shelves of bookstores are congested with books that relate Shari’a law to violent
behavior such as terrorism, chopping off the heads of disbelievers, and stoning sinners. Other books
depict Shari’a law as the model of patriarchal regimes which allows polygamy and encourages female
submissiveness and inferiority.
On the other hand, Shari’a law is regarded by Muslims, and many non-Muslims, as a morally uplifting
system of rules which promotes justice and peace. In political discourse, Shari’a law was devised as
“the solution” by political parties in some Muslim countries while some western politicians stigmatize
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Shari’a law as a regime which is essentially incompatible with the values of freedom and equity. The
user of the term “Shari’a law” and the context within which it is being used can drastically change the
meaning it refers to.88
Against these conflicting views, one may plausibly ask: Do Muslims equate the cruelty and patriarchy
of Shari’a law, as portrayed by some westerners, with the notions of goodness, peace, and justice?
How can the conception of “Shari’a law” accommodate this labyrinth? What is Shari’a law?
As captivating as it could be to attempt to answer these questions, it is slightly beyond the purpose of
this paper. This part of the paper is rather concerned with highlighting the difficulty of articulating an
interpretation of Shari’a law in a legal context.
It is of primary importance to draw a distinction between the terms Shari’a, Fiqh, and Islamic law.
Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably, their meaning and significance in the
scholarship of the Islamic religion is substantially different.89 On the one hand, Shari’a, or Al Shari’a,
is an Arabic word which literally means “the right path.”90 Shari’a refers to the primary sources of the
Islamic religion, namely the Holy Qur’an (the word of God) and the Sunnah (the words and acts of the
Prophet Muhammed). These two sources are of a divine nature and their commandments are
immutable.91 On the other hand, Fiqh, in the Arabic language, means precise understating or
comprehension.92 Fiqh refers to the methodology of deducing rules based on the rational reading and
interpretation of the sources of the Islamic religion.93 In addition to the primary sources of the Islamic
religion, the Qur’an and the Sunnah, there are two subordinate sources, namely: Ijma’ and Qiyas.94
The former means the consensus, and it refers to the matters on which scholars of Islam have agreed
on their rules while the latter refers to rules which can be deduced by the logic of analogy. The term
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Islamic law, or Shari’a law, generally refers to the regime of Islamic religion including: the primary
sources, the subordinate sources, and the methodology of deducing rules (Fiqh).95
The primary sources of the Islamic religion are of a divine nature; they are timeless and
unchangeable.96 Subordinate sources, however, are deduced by human intellectual process called
Ijtihad.97 The findings of Ijtihad are not symmetrical among the scholars of the Islamic religion. For
that reason, despite having one Qur’an and Sunnah, no less than 19 schools (Fiqh Madhhab) developed
during the first four centuries of Islam producing diverse juristic opinions.98 As a result, Shari’a law,
as a system of rules or a legal regime, is not monolithic since it accommodates a magnitude of
jurisprudential difference within it. Afshari describes the non-monolithic character of Islamic law by
suggesting that: “one must keep in mind the diversity and complexity of Islamic traditions. When
reference is made to (Islamic law) a host of diverse positions, numerous schools of law, and many
Islamic sects, each pronouncing conflicting interpretations, comes into the picture.”99
This multiplicity of the Islamic jurisprudence constitutes a confounding challenge to the competent
court. The latter should overrule the enforcement of ratified instruments if they are incompatible with
the rulings of Shari’a law. The way to reach this conclusion, is to apply a compatibility test between
the ratified instrument and the rulings of Shari’a law; however, in applying such a test, the court is left
with multiple scholarly groups, diverse juristic opinions and no legislative guiding.
The following subsection sheds light on guidance from the provisions of the constitution and the
practice of the SCC
2.

Shari’a Law in the Constitution

Over almost fifty years, Shari’a law has been a cornerstone in the lawmaking process in Egypt. It
started with the Constitution of 1971 which stated in the second Article that “Principles of Shari’a law
is a main source of legislation.”100 In 1980, the wording of this Article was amended to “Principles of
Shari’a law is the main source of legislation.”101 Since 1980 and until the present constitution, the
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wording of this provision has remained unchanged.102 The interpretation of this provision, especially
after the 1980 amendment, has summoned academic, political, and legal discussions.103 Such
discussions remained unresolved until the SCC commenced to approach the matter. In the following
paragraphs, the endeavors of the SCC will be chronologically outlined.
In 1985, Al-Azhar University, one of the most influential Islamic institutions in the world, was sued
for failing to honor a contractual payment. The plaintiff (the creditor) claimed the right to collect
interest on the outstanding debt as established by Article 226 of the Egyptian Civil Code. In counter,
Al-Azhar University claimed that the mentioned Article contradicts the principles of Shari’a law and,
therefore, invoked its unconstitutionality. The case was referred to the SCC to decide over the
constitutionality of the Article. The court held that the constitutional reference to the principles of
Shari’a law bears a prospective legal effect and does not apply retroactively. Practically, this means
that the conformity of domestic legislation with the principles of Shari’a law is to be observed in all
laws and amendments enacted in a subsequent date to the constitutional provision. In the word of the
judgment, the court held that:
[F]rom the date of the coming into effect of the amended text of the last
phrase of Article 2 of the Constitution of 23 May, 1980, The Legislative
Authority has become bound, in its new enactments, or in amendments
it introduces to its former legal enactments, to see to it that such
enactments conform to the principles of Islamic law, and do not
constitute infringement of the norm and limitations laid down in other
constitutional texts… [I]n view of the fact that the obligation imposed
on the Legislator to follow the principles of the Shari’a and to consider
them as the principal source of legislation is aimed only at the legislative
enactments which are issued after the date of the imposition of the said
obligation, and does not cover former legislative enactments… [S]uch
prior enactments are immune from the application of the limitation
because of its anterior date, which is the determining factor on which
proper constitutional control is based…104
Defining the scope of application of Article 2 with regards to the time was a significant progress in
determining its effect on the existing laws. Following this judgement, the constitutionality of all laws
enacted prior to 1980 is not subject to the application of this Article. However, the ambiguity of
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defining the reference of “principles of Shari’a law” as pronounced in the constitutional provision
remained unresolved. As a result, the Article was devised as a challenge of unconstitutionality against
a number of legislation and administrative decrees.105 In these challenges, the SCC concluded that
“principles of Shari’a law” refers to the fundamental principles of Shari’a which are well-established
in the Islamic religion and accepted by all Muslims and agreed on by all scholars of Islam. This
approach will be further detailed below.
In Case No. 8 of Judicial Year 17, the SCC has described the fundamental principles of Shari’a as the
rulings which are absolutely certain with respect to their authenticity and meaning. The case tells the
story of a father whose both daughters were refused entry to their secondary school based on the
ministerial decision forbidding students wearing “Niqab”106 from entering schools. The father
challenged the constitutionality of this decree upon the violation of principles of Shari’a law and
personal freedom.107 The Court overturned the challenge and reasoned its finding based on the
following:
The Supreme Constitutional Court has been charged with the duty to
watch out for violation of these [Shari’a rulings that are absolutely
certain with respect to both their authenticity and meaning] and to
overturn any [statutory] rule (qa'ida) that contradicts them…. These
[rulings] are [the shari'a's] general framework and foundational pillars,
whose demands impose themselves permanently and prevent
establishment of any legal rule that violates them…. They fall within the
realm to which ijtihad is limited and Beyond which ijtihad does not
extend….
Islam raised the share of the woman. It inspired her to safeguard her
chastity (afafiha). It commanded her to protect herself from shame and
degradation so that woman would raise herself above those things that
could sully her or dishonor her, especially through her attire, tenderness
in speech, refinement in walking, bringing her allurements into view,
tempting others, or revealing "adornments" that were concealed….
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The form of her clothes and appearance are not [however] fixed by
scriptural texts that have been determined to be certain either with
respect to their authenticity or with respect to their meaning….
And whereas: the classical Islamic jurists (fuqaha') disagreed among
themselves in the subject of the interpretation of Qur'anic texts and of
what has been transmitted from the Prophet in the form of strong and
weak hadiths. Their opinions were similar with regard to the dress of a
woman and with regard to what she must cover of her body….
And whereas: In view of this, the contested [ministerial] Decision does
not infringe on freedom of creed, destroy its foundations, or obstruct the
rites of [religious] practice. It does not defy the essence of religion (din)
in the universal roots (al-usul al-kulliyya) upon which the Shari’a is
founded. Rather it expresses the legitimate, acceptable exercise of
ijtihad aiming only to regulate girls' dress within the realm of
educational institutions...
The Decision is within the realm of permitted regulation and cannot be
considered a weakening of the freedom of creed.108
Through this approach, the SCC has significantly reduced the reference of “principles of Shari’a law”
to the very few fundamental rules of the Islamic religion which are agreed upon by all jurists. The SCC
has also provided clear guidance to other courts on how to assess the compatibility of other laws with
the rulings of Shari’a law in order to evaluate their constitutionality.
In this context, light should be shed on the preamble of the Constitution of 2014 which states: “We are
drafting a Constitution that affirms that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of
legislation, and that the reference for the interpretation of such principles lies in the body of the relevant
Supreme Constitutional Court Rulings.”109 Therefore, the constitution has conferred upon the SCC the
sole power to interpret the rulings of Shari’a law.
In sum, Shari’a law is a vague term which usage can have varied connotations. This vagueness creates
a legal challenge when courts are required to interpret the constitutional reference to Shari’a law. The
SCC has attempted to dispel this vagueness by interpreting Shari’a law in a narrowed scope of Islamic
jurisprudence; thus, it has formulated a methodology for inferior courts before which the question of
defining what is meant by Shari’a law could be raised.
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III.

The Trilemma

Egypt has shown a tendency to formulate Shari’a law reservations when ratifying human rights
instruments. By virtue of this reservations, the ratified instrument ceases to apply when its provisions
are inconsistent with Shari’a law. Since Egypt is a monist state i.e. it confers upon ratified international
instruments the force of law, ratified human rights instruments are legally enforceable.110 As a result,
domestic laws enacted at a later date following the ratification of those instruments should be
compliant with the standards prescribed in those instruments; likewise, existing laws should be
mitigated or amended to comply with those standards. However, domestic laws in Egypt present
numerous discrepant provisions to ratified human rights instruments. In such cases, the ratified
instruments can be invoked as a defense against the application of non-compliant laws in order to cease
their application. However, the allegation of violating Shari’a law can halt the invocation of the ratified
instrument. Thus, the competent court, in this situation, is presented with three separate legal
instruments: (i) the non-compliant law, (ii) the ratified human rights instrument, and (iii) the
formulated Shari’a law reservation.
This Chapter deals with the difficulty that arises when a ratified treaty is invoked against the
application of a non-compliant law. This difficulty can be manifested in three questions: (1) Should
the competent court apply the non-compliant law despite the conflict with the ratified human rights
instrument? (2) Should the ratified instrument overrule the non-compliant law? (3) In case the treaty
embodies Shari’a law reservation, how can the competent court interpret Shari’a law? The first section
introduces the trilemma and elaborates on the difficulty of resolving it. The following sections analyze
three cases where the trilemma arises and examines the court resolution thereof.
A.

Why is it a Trilemma?

A trilemma is “a state of things in which it is difficult to determine which one of three courses to
pursue.”111 This paper uses this term to describe the situation when a ratified human rights instrument
is invoked against the application of a non-compliant law, and where the instrument must comply with
the rulings of Shari’a law in order to overrule the application of the instrument. This situation
symbolizes a trilemma because the competent court should normally apply domestic law, but it should
also apply ratified human rights instruments for their legal force; in addition, the court should assess
the compatibility of the ratified instrument with the rulings of Shari’a law by virtue of the formulated
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reservation. In this trilemma, the court is left with no clear guidance from the legislator or from the
judicial practice of superior courts.
The provision of the constitutional Article 151 vests on ratified international instruments the legal
force of law when these treaties are parliamentary-approved and published in the Official Gazette.112
As a consequence, a ratified instrument that fulfills the conditions stipulated by the Constitution
becomes an integral part of the domestic law. This constitutional provision gives no real guidance to
the competent court in resolving the conflict between ratified instruments and domestic law. The
mentioned provision makes the ratified instruments as enforceable as law, but it does not regulate the
situation when a conflict arises therein.
Judicial practice has attempted to fill this legislative void. The Court of High State Security attempted
to resolve the conflict between the provision of the EPC and the ICESCR towards labor strikes by
applying the rule of “lex posterior derogat legi priori”113 which entails that a subsequent law repeals
any conflicting earlier laws.114 Based on this criterion, ratified instruments should overrule the
application of any conflicting law enacted in an earlier date.
Although the application of rule lex posterior derogat legi priori deems legally plausible and practical,
the SCC has differently decided the conflict between freedom of religion as established by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)115 and the administrative decree banning the practice
of Bahá’í rituals.116 The court held that Article 151 confers the legal force of laws on ratified
instruments and found that the application of a non-compliant law over a ratified treaty is not a
constitutional violation.117 The court reasoned the finding as follows:
The UDHR signed by Egypt merely constitutes a non-binding
recommendation to the Egyptian government to consider its provisions.
The UDHR does not hold the legal authoritativeness of ratified
international treaties. Even with those treaties, the enactment of a law or
the issuance of an administrative decree violating their provisions does
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not constitute a constitutional violation. Those treaties hold the legal
force of laws, yet they do not supersede laws.118
Following this dictum, the competent court is not obliged to apply the ratified instrument, but it is
entitled to apply it. In either course, no constitutional violation shall be recorded.
In addition to the difficulty of deciding the conflict between domestic laws and ratified treaties, the
interpretation of Shari’a law reservations intensifies the complexity of the trilemma. The invoked
instrument’s provision should be rendered inoperative if it is found in contradiction with the rulings of
Shari’a law. The competent court is left with no legislative guidance or clear judicial practice on the
methodology of applying the compatibility test between the invoked instrument and the rulings of
Shari’a law.
If the competent court is entitled to examine the legality of Shari’a law reservation and review its
domestic effect, the competent court could invalidate Shari’a law reservation based on its violation to
the rules of the VCLT. Therefore, this trilemma would simply turn into the classical dilemma of the
conflict between international law and domestic law. However, as previously explained, 119 the power
of the competent court to examine the legality of ratified instruments is opposed by multiple
implications.120
In sum, when the trilemma arises, the competent court is presented with two complex questions,
namely: (1) Should the ratified instrument supersede the non-compliant law, or vice versa? (2) How
can Shari’a law reservations be interpreted? Neither the legislature nor the judicial practice provides
consistent guidance on the resolution of the two questions. As a result, the competent court is entitled
to apply the non-compliant law despite its contradiction with the ratified instrument, or vice versa; the
court is also entitled to discretionally interpret Shari’a law reservation formulated in the invoked
instrument.
B.

The Notarization of Apostasy between the ICCPR and the rulings of Shari’a Law

This section examines the trilemma arising out of the legal framework of notarizing a conversion from
Islam, freedom of religion as established by the ICCPR, and Shari’a law reservation formulated
thereof. The first subsection explains the legal foundations for the discussed trilemma. The second
subsection demonstrates the Administrative Court’s approach in resolving the trilemma.
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1.

Apostasy in the Egyptian Legal System

It is of primary importance to identify the terminology of apostasy. The term “Apostasy” or “Ridda”
refers to the cases when a Muslim chooses to abandon Islam or renounce it. The essence of apostasy
is inherent to abandoning Islam. Hence, there is no difference whether the apostate chooses another
religion or not. Also, the term does not apply to non-Muslims who choose to abandon their religions,
and in case they convert to Islam, they are said to have “embraced Islam.”121
The Egyptian Constitution does not prohibit apostasy; conversely, it affirms freedom of belief. The
first paragraph of Article 64 of the present Constitution reads: “Freedom of belief is absolute.”122 As a
result, one can argue that based on the “absolute” freedom of belief endorsed by the constitution,
apostasy is not an illegal action.
To a similar effect, Egypt is a signatory state to the ICCPR.123 Article 18 of the Covenant states that:
1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience and
religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion
or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in community
with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.
2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom
to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.124
Since Egypt has ratified the Covenant, and the ratification was published in the Official Gazette,125 the
Covenant has become an integral part of domestic laws based on the authority of ratified international
instruments as stipulated by the Constitution.126 However, Egypt has restricted the application of the
ICCPR with the following reservation: “Taking into consideration the provisions of the Islamic Sharia
and the fact that they do not conflict with the text annexed to the instrument, we accept, support and
ratify it.”127 Thus, the ICCPR should cease to apply in cases which are inconsistent with Shari’a law.
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Moreover, no criminal or civil statute directly deals with apostasy by prohibition. Therefore, and based
on the rule of “Nullum crimen sine lege,”128 an apostate should not suffer a punishment if the action is
not legally punishable. However, an examination of judicial practice towards cases of apostasy reveals
that the action does bear legal consequences on the criminal, administrative, and personal status levels.
In spite of the absence of any clear provision criminalizing the action of apostasy, a criminal charge
can be instituted against an apostate. Article 98 (f) of EPC deals with blasphemy, or the exploitation
of religion for propagating extremist thoughts or disdaining a divine religion.129 The application of this
Article has been judicially extended to apply to cases of apostasy on the premise that whoever commits
apostasy is necessarily committing blasphemy against Islam. As observed in The Egyptian Initiative
for Personal Rights and Human Rights Watch report that:
The government has used Article 98(f) of the Penal Code to criminalize
actions or other expressions of unorthodox religious views, including
conversion from Islam…As the testimonies in this report indicate,
officials have interpreted this Article to proscribe conversion from Islam
on the grounds that such conversion disparages Islam and is thus
incompatible with public order.130
In the realm of personal statues law, the act of apostasy results in consequences with regards to
marriage and inheritance. In the famous case of Nasser Abu Hamed, the Court found that Abu Hamed
has committed apostasy based on his critical writings about Islamic jurisprudence and annulled his
marriage to a Muslim woman in repercussion.131 The Court of Cassation also held that an apostate is
not entitled to inherit form Muslims.132 In case someone is found apostate, the court even interferes to
determine the religious status of the apostate’s children.133
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Although apostasy appears in the judicial practice of criminal and personal status courts, this section
is chiefly concerned with the intersection where apostasy meets the administrative law, as shall be
discussed below.
Civil Status Law No. 143 of year 1994 requires all citizens, upon reaching the age of sixteen, to obtain
an identification card.134 The failure to adhere to this provision is punishable by a fine not exceeding
two hundred pounds.135 The law also requires all citizens to report to the Civil Status Department any
change of the details embodied in the identification card.136 However, the law does not permit the
change of religion except by virtue of a court judgment. Article 47 of the law reads:
Any change or rectification of the details regarding birth, death, or
family matters is doable when permitted by a decision from the
committee mentioned in the last article. Changes or rectifications
regarding nationality, religion, or profession …… are only doable by
virtue of court judgments or authenticated documents issued from
competent offices.137
Against this backdrop, an apostate is legally obliged to report the abandonment of Islam to the Civil
Status Department, but the latter is not allowed to apply such modification except by virtue of a court
judgement declaring this person as no longer an affiliate of the Islamic religion. As a result, the Civil
Status Department turns down the apostate’s request to have its conversion from Islam authenticated
in the details of the identification card. The apostate takes the rejection to the Administrative Court
demanding the enforcement of its request to change the religious detail by the Civil Status Department.
In establishing the request, recourse can be made to the absolute freedom of belief as endorsed by the
constitution, as well as Egypt obligation to guarantee freedom of belief as stated by the ICCPR.
The court in the mentioned scenario encounters the legal trilemma. On the one hand, the court should
allow the notarization of apostasy based on the constitutional provision on the absolute freedom of
belief as well as Egypt’s obligation towards the ICCPR to guarantee such freedom. On the other hand,
if apostasy is found inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law, the application of the ICCPR is to be
halted by virtue of the formulated reservation.
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2.

The Court Resolution

In 2008, The Egyptian Administrative Court heard the case of an apostate who had converted from
Islam to Christianity.138 The plaintiff requested the Civil Status Department to notarize the conversion;
however, his request was rejected. The plaintiff demanded an official recognition of his conversion.
The demand was predicated on the constitutional provision of freedom of belief as well as Egypt’s
obligation to guarantee such freedom as stated in the ICCPR. The court examined the case and analysed
the plaintiff’s request in light of constitutional and legislative provisions. The court analysis
acknowledged Egypt’s obligation towards the ICCPR. The court also highlighted that the Covenant’s
application is restricted in cases where it is inconsistent with Shari’a law based on the formulated
reservation thereto. The court held that the action of apostasy is an essential violation of Shari’a law,
and thus overruled the plaintiff’s request. The court justified its ruling by:
Most of the Egyptian people are Muslims. Islam affirms freedom of
belief. It grants non-Muslims the freedom to choose their divine religion,
but it bans those Muslims who practiced its rituals from abandoning it
because it is the last word of God. Islam is modelled as an aspect of the
Egyptian public policy, and it should, thus, be respected.
Whereas the action of apostasy whether in the form of conversion,
disdaining Islam, or denying its fundamental rules has existed parallel
to the Islamic religion, Islamic jurisprudence despite disagreeing on its
punishment, has long agreed that apostasy is a great sin.
Divine religions have descended from God in an order. The conversion
that follows that order is permissible. Judaism was the first word of God,
Christianity followed, and Islam ended that order. Hence, he who
believes in Judaism is invited to Christianity, and he who believes in
Christianity is invited to embrace Islam. Any conversion that violates
that order should not be permitted because it violates the divine order of
religions as well as Egypt’s public policy.
Islam elevates freedom of religion, among its rules is that: (i) no
coercion in religion, (ii) he who wishes to, let him believe and he who
decides to, let him disbelieve. Therefore, Muslims are not allowed to
force non-Muslims to follow Islam, and those non-Muslims are entitled
to withstand their religion. This is how freedom of belief is manifested.
Nevertheless, a Muslim who consented to believe and accepted its
norms is not allowed, as states by holy verses, to abandon Islam.
The plaintiff also premised his request on the international instruments
signed by Egypt which uphold the absolute freedom of people to believe
what they perceive as religion. Although these instruments became,
based on its ratification, an integral part of domestic laws….
138

The Egyptian Administrative Court, Challenge No. 35647, Year 61, Court hearing dated on January 29 th, 2008.

30

Nonetheless, Egypt is a Muslim country and most of the Egyptian people
are Muslims; as result, the Egyptian government used its legislative
sovereignty when ratified the mentioned instruments, and reserved their
application in cases of inconsistency with Shari’a law.139
In this case, the court approached the trilemma by establishing that apostasy is prohibited by rulings
of Shari’a law; hence, it ousted the ICCPR based on Shari’a law reservation formulated thereto and
upheld the bureaucratic renunciation to notarize conversion from Islam. The same reasoning has been
employed in an abundance of court rulings disallowing the notarization of conversion from Islam.140
Likewise, courts have also showed reluctance to notarize non-Abrahamic religions such as the Bahá’í
faith.141
In sum, Egypt has endorsed freedom of belief as stated in the ICCPR. Since Egypt has ratified,
approved, and published the ICCPR, it has become an integral part of its domestic law. However, the
notarization of conversion from Islam deems to be impressible in Egypt based on the law of Civil
Status. When this conflict arose before the Administrative Court, the latter decided to set aside the
ICCPR based on the Islamic prohibition of apostasy.
C.

The Legality of Labor Strike between ICESCR and the Interpretation of Shari’a Law

This section focuses on the trilemma arising out of the rules regulating labor strikes in Egypt. The first
subsection examines those rules in the (i) constitution, (ii) ratified international instruments, (iii) and
domestic laws. The second subsection analyses the trilemma arising out of these rules and shows the
court resolution to it.
1.

Labor Strike in the Egyptian Legal System

The position of labor strike in the Egyptian legal system poses a crucial legal question. Although the
legality of the action is affirmed by the constitution and other legal instruments, the Administrative
Court has applied penalties upon its doers.
The Constitution affirms the legality of strikes. Article (15) of the Constitution of 2014 states that:
“Peaceful strike is a right regulated by Law.”142 Thus, going on a strike is a constitutional right.
Moreover, one can argue that the exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted into a crime.143
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However, the right to strike is not absolute; it is conditional on its peaceful character. If the strike
involves public indecency, any form of violence, endangering property or disrupting public safety, the
strike is not peaceful, and is thus punishable.144
Furthermore, the fourth book of the Egyptian Labor Law no.12 of 2003 regulates the exercise of labor
strikes in the fourth book of the law.145 Article 192 reads “The workers shall have the right to stage a
peaceful strike.”146
In addition to the Constitution, Egypt has ratified the ICESCR, but formulated a reservation against its
application in cases where it contradicts Shari’a law.147 Article 8 lit (d) of the Covenant states: “The
States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to ensure:…the right to strike, provided that it is
exercised in conformity with the laws of the particular country.”148 The ratification was approved by
the parliament and published in the Official Gazette.149 The ICESCR has, thus, become an integral part
of Egyptian domestic law.150
In recognizing the domestic authority of the covenant, The Court of High State Security has found that
the action of labour strike cannot be a crime based on the ratification of the ICESCR. The Court relied
on the rule of “lex posterior derogat legi priori” and further held that Article 124 of the Egyptian Penal
Code has been set aside with the ratification of the covenant.151
Nevertheless, with relation to the Egyptian Revolution in 2011, Presidential Decree No. 34 of Year
2011 was issued.152 The Decree declared a state of emergency all over the country and banned any
form of demonstration or strike that might hinder the progress of public offices and governmental
institutions.153
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Based on the above-mentioned rules, peaceful strikes are, in principal, legitimate actions, and their
exercise should not result in any legal charges against its doers.
2.

The Court Resolution

In spite of the legal provisions and the previous court findings guaranteeing the legality of labor strike,
the Administrative Court has, in a later judgement,154 found that the labor strike is a violation of the
“due behavior of public servants.”155 The Court decided to outlaw labor strikes, and premised its
finding on the detrimental consequences resulting from strikes. The Court also revised the application
of the ICESCR with regards to the labor strike, and further held that the action of the labor strike is
against the rulings of Shari’a law. The Court concluded that the ICESCR is ousted by virtue of its
Shari’a law reservation. The judgment was reasoned as follows:
Article (8) of the ICESCR restricts the implementation of the rights
stipulated therein to the conformity with the applicable domestic laws.
The mentioned Article reads: “… provided that it is exercised in
conformity with the laws of the particular country.” Besides, Egypt
signed the Covenant, yet formulated a reservation to the implementation
of this Covenant in cases of inconsistency with the rulings of Shari’a
law. Moreover, the Presidential Decree No 527 of Year 1981 precludes
the applicability of the Covenant in cases of inconsistency with the
rulings of Shari’a law. The Covenant was published in the Official
Gazette in April 8, 1982. Therefore, the Egyptian government undertook
to ensure the right to strike; however, the exercise of such right must be
in conformity with the rulings of Shari’a law.
For the Covenant to be applied, the right to strike is to be examined, and
found consistent with the jurisprudential rulings of Shari’a law.
Shari’a law classifies the concept of interest, or Al Maslaha,156 into three
categories, namely: (i) an interest related to an individual, (ii) an interest
related to a group of persons, and (iii) an interest related to the public.
In regulating those interests, Shari’a law has coined principles such as:
(avoiding harm prevails/supersedes obtaining gain), (less harm can be
used to repel greater harm), (public harm is to repelled even by inflicting
individual harm), and (harm cannot be repelled through an equal harm).
Labor strike is a collective and deliberate refusal to fulfill the work
chores. Labor resort to striking as a tool of pressure against their
employer to reach a joint gain. Although labor are entitled to seek their
collective benefits through going on strikes, the service provided for the
public should not be disrupted or jeopardized as a result of such strikes.
In other words, if the service provided for the public is ceased, worsened,
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or degraded, the labor strike would be a means that inflicts harm to the
public and conveys gain to an individual or a group of individuals.
Whereas the interest of the public prevails the interest related to an
individual or a group of individuals, labor strike is an impermissible
action as per Shari’a law rulings. Therefore, the ICESCR is out of
action.157
The Court analyzed the action of striking against the rulings of Shari’a law. Based on the concept of
gain and harm, the court held that striking is inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law; thus,
concluded that ICESCR is inoperative. The Court found the strikers guilty and referred them to early
retirement as a penalty for their action.
This judgement has been exposed to intense scrutiny and critique.158 On the one hand, the judgement
neglected the Constitutional provision on the legality of peaceful strike. Likewise, the judgement
premised its finding on an outdated law (Presidential Decree No.34 of Year 2011). On the other hand,
the Court articulated an ambiguous interpretation of Shari’a law, and decided to strike down the
application of the ICESCR based on that interpretation. However, the purpose of this section is to
highlight how the court approached the trilemma and resolved in legal terms.
In sum, this section tackles the trilemma arising out of the position of labor strike in the Egyptian legal
system. A peaceful strike is a constitutional right; moreover, Egypt has ratified the ICESCR which
obliges its signatory states to guarantee the legality of the action. However, Egypt has formulated a
Shari’a law reservation to the ICESCR and restricted its application in cases where it violates the
rulings of Shari’a law. However, Presidential Decree No. 34 of Year 2011 banned all strikes during
the time of emergency. The Administrative Court approached the trilemma and held that the rulings
of Shari’a law ban the striking, and further held that the ICESCR is inapplicable thereof. The Court
found the strikers guilty for violating the due behavior of public servants and referred them to early
retirement.
D.

Penal Provisions Constituting Discrimination against Women and CEDAW

Women’s rights have joined the discourse of human rights in 1948 by virtue of the UDHR.159 Those
rights have been crystalized in both the ICCPR and ICESCR.160 In 1979, the UN General Assembly
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passed CEDAW as a comprehensive instrument for the issue of discrimination against women.161
CEDAW lays down a strong framework for addressing the issue of gender discrimination. The first
Article formulates a full-scale definition of the concept of “discrimination against women.”162 More
importantly, CEDAW imposes an obligation upon signatory states to formulate immediate policies
aimed at eradicating discrimination against women. Article 2 of the Convention reads:
States Parties condemn discrimination against women in all its forms,
agree to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating discrimination against women and, to this end, undertake:
…
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of men and women in their
national constitutions or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law and other appropriate
means, the practical realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other measures, including
sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against
women;
(c) To establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis
with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other
public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of
discrimination;
(d) To refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination
against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall
act in conformity with this obligation;
(e) To take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against
women by any person, organization or enterprise;
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or
abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;
(g) To repeal all national penal provisions which constitute
discrimination against women.163

161

For information about the date of entry into force and state signatories of the treaty, see the official website of the
United Nation Treaty Collection website, Available at:
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=IV-8&chapter=4&lang=en [accessed 6 March
2018]. Also see supra note 52.
162
Article one of CEDAW reads: “For the purposes of the present Convention, the term "discrimination against women"
shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing
or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality
of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any
other field.” See Id.
163
Id.

35

Based on this Article, signatory states are obliged to ensure the non-discriminatory character of their
national legislation. As a result, legislation must be enacted in compliance with the non-discriminatory
provision of the Convention and existing discriminatory legislation must be mitigated in order to
become compliant with such provisions. The state is, likewise, obliged to refrain from any
administrative practice that undermines women’s rights.
Egypt became a signatory state to CEDAW in 1981. The ratification of CEDAW was published in the
Official Gazette.164 Thus, CEDAW has become an enforceable legal instrument within the Egyptian
legal system.165 Nevertheless, the obligation to comply with CEDAW is not absolute. Egypt has
formulated a Shari’a law reservation against Article 2 of CEDAW.166 The reservation reads: “The Arab
Republic of Egypt is willing to comply with the content of this article, provided that such compliance
does not run counter to the Islamic Sharia.”167 Therefore, Egypt is not obliged by the provisions of
Article 2 in cases of inconsistency with the rulings of Shari’a law.
This section examines the trilemma that arises among (i) the discriminatory provisions of the EPC (ii)
the obligation prescribed in Article 2 lit (g) of CEDAW, and (iii) Shari’a law reservation formulated
thereto. The first subsection presents two examples of penal provisions which stipulate unequal legal
treatment to women. The second subsection discusses the tension between CEDAW obligations and
the Shari’a law reservation formulated thereto.
1.

The De Jure Gender Discrimination in EPC

As prescribed in Article 2 lit (g) of CEDAW, Egypt is obliged to “repeal all national penal provisions
which constitute discrimination against women.”168 Egypt has, however, reserved the application of
the Article in case its application is inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law.169 This subsection
presents two examples of discriminatory penal provisions, namely: adultery and honor killing.
a)

Adultery: An Unjustified Discriminatory Legal Framework

The provisions regulating adultery in the EPC form a clear example of gender discrimination. The
legislator has designated separate paths to establish the commitment of adultery against wife and
husband. The legislature has also prescribed a harsher punishment for adultery against the wife than
the husband. This legislative approach can be seen in Articles 274 and 277 of the EPC. The former
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states: “[a] married woman whose adultery is established shall be punished with detention for a period
not exceeding 2 years.”170 Article 277 reads: “[a]ny husband who commits adultery in the marital
house... shall be punished with detention for a period not exceeding six months.”171 Based on the
reading of these two Articles, the gender discrimination, with regards to the establishment of the crime
and its punishment is apparent.
With regards to the commitment of adultery, the legislature draws a clear distinction between husband
and wife. Unlike wife adultery, which is merely established by the commitment of the action, husband
adultery is only established if the action is committed in the marital house. As an elaboration, a husband
may have sexual affairs with women other than his wife anywhere outside his marital house, and his
action will remain crime free.172 Conversely, the wife’s adultery is criminalized irrespective of the
location where the crime takes place.
To a similar effect, the legislature has prescribed a harsher punishment against wife adultery than a
husband’s. A detention for a period not exceeding two years is the punishment of wife adultery whereas
husband adultery is punishable by detention not exceeding six months.
Against this legislative approach, one may ask: if the act of infidelity is the inherent ground of
criminalizing adultery, why is the husband’s action of infidelity outside the marital house is not
criminalized? Likewise, why is the punishment for wife adultery is four times harsher than husband
adultery? Nevertheless, commenting on the peculiarity of the legal framework to adultery in EPC is
beyond the purpose of this subsection.173 The purpose here is to demonstrate the discriminatory
character of such framework.
b)

Honor Killing174

The Egyptian legislature recognizes the concept of honor killing. Article 237 of the EPC confers a
punishment reduction on the murderer’s husband who catches his adulteress wife red-handed. The
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Article reads: “Whoever surprises his wife in the act of adultery and kills her on the spot together with
her adulterer-partner shall be punished with detention instead of the penalties prescribed in articles 234
and 236.”175 While a murderer is to be prosecuted via Article 234 of the EPC which stipulates a
punishment of “permanent or temporary hard labor,”176 a murderer husband who kills his wife upon
catching her committing adultery will not face that punishment.
Jurists and scholars of the EPC have justified the differentiation between murder and honor killing
upon the psychological state of mind of the murderer husband. The latter, upon the sight of his wife
committing adultery, develops a sinister state of mind that makes his subsequent actions less
controllable. Thus, the murder resulting from such a state of mind is of different nature than planned
murder, and the punishment prescribed thereto should be different.177 Based on that juristic
determination, the punishment reduction of honor killing deems conceivable.
Nevertheless, unlike the Jordanian and Algerian penal codes which confer the punishment reduction
in case of honor killings to both spouses,178 the EPC confines the provision of Article 237 only to the
husband. As a result, a wife who witnesses her adulterer husband in action, and kills him, does not
benefit from the provision of Article 237; that wife would face the charge of Article 234 which is
punishable by permanent or temporarily hard labor.179
In Article 237, the Egyptian legislature has recognized the concept of honor killing and reduced the
punishment for the killing occasioned with honor. However, the legislature restricted the benefit of the
Article to husbands over wives.
2.

The Penal Gender Discrimination Versus CEDAW

The two mentioned examples in the last subsection show plain gender discrimination. Whereas Article
2 lit (g) of CEDAW obliges its signatory states to repeal all discriminatory penal provisions, Egypt has
accepted that obligation. In addition, CEDAW has been ratified and published in the Official
Gazette;180 thus, it has acquired the force of domestic law. Against this backdrop, the paper postulates

175

See article 237 of the EPC. Supra note 71
See article 234 of the EPC. Supra note 71. Noting that the punishment is aggravated to death penalty if the murder is
premediated and/or ambushed. Article 230 -232 of EPC.
177
Ahmed F. Srour, Private Section-Penal Code, Crimes Prejudicial to The Public Interest – Crimes of Individuals –
Funds Crimes, 734 (Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiyya 2013) (2013).
178
See article 279 of the Algerian Penal Code. Alegria: Penal Code [Algeria], Issued by Decree No. 66-156, June 1966,
available at: http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=7998 [accessed 23 February 2018]. See also article 340
Jordan: Penal Code [Jordan], No. 16 of 1960 as amended by Law No. 8 of 2011, available at:
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=15077 [accessed 23 February 2018]
179
Supra note 176.
180
Supra note 164.
176

38

two hypothetical scenarios: (i) CEDAW is invoked by an adulteress wife as a defense against the
application of Article 274 of the EPC claiming that this Article constitutes discrimination against
women and should, thus, be repealed,181 and (ii) CEDAW is invoked by a wife that committed an
honor killing requesting to benefit from the punishment reduction stipulated in Article 237 of the
EPC.182
The invocation of CEDAW in the previous two scenarios evokes the trilemma. As a demonstration,
the competent court will have to resolve the discriminatory character of the penal provisions against
CEDAW’s obligation to revoke any discriminatory provisions; in addition, the court must find that the
revocation of those provisions is consistent with the rulings of Shari’a law; otherwise, the Shari’a law
reservation should halt the treaty.
As for the first scenario, the discriminatory character of the EPC in establishing and punishing adultery
does not stem from the rulings of Shari’a law. Conversely, the latter prescribes the same punishment
for adultery committed by the husband or the wife. 24:2 of the Holy Quaran reads: “The adulterer and
the adulteress, scourge ye each one of them with a hundred stripes.”183 As a result, the revocation of
Article 274 does not contradict rulings of Shari’a law.
As for the second scenario, the rulings of Shari’a law with regards to reward and punishment have, in
plentiful verses, showed utter equality between men and women. In the context of rewarding, 16:97
reads: “Whosoever doeth right, whether male or female, and is a believer, him verily we shall quicken
with good life.”184 Likewise, 9:72 reads: “Allah promiseth to the believers, men and women, Gardens
underneath which rivers flow, wherein they will abide - blessed dwellings in Gardens of Ede..”185 In
the context of punishment, Shari’a law has stipulated equal punishment for men and women who
commit adultery or robbery.186 Verse 5:38 reads: “As for the thief, both male and female, cut off their
hands.”187 In addition, Verse 9:68 reads: “Allah promiseth the hypocrites, both men and women, and
the disbelievers fire of hell for their abode.”188 Based on the mentioned verses, one can argue that the
Holy Qur’an designate an equal treatment for men and women in the concept of punishment and
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rewarding. Therefore, the male-privileging provision of Article 237 is not Shari’a driven, and its
revocation does not contradict the rulings with Shari’a law.
Against this backdrop, one can argue that the competent court is entitled to refuse the application of
the discriminatory provision of Article 274 or to extend the benefit of Article 237 to the honor killing
committed by a wife. The competent court may premise its finding on the force of CEDAW. Whereas
the latter obliges Egypt, as a signatory member, to repeal the discriminatory penal provisions, and
whereas CEDAW has acquired the force of domestic laws, the publication of CEDAW’s ratification
considerably deems to repeal such discriminatory penal provisions, except the ones which stem from
the rulings of Shari’a law.
In sum, this section discusses the trilemma that can evoke among (i) gender discriminatory penal
provisions, (ii) Article 2 lit (g) of CEDAW, and (iii) Shari’a law reservation formulated to Article 2 lit
(g) of CEDAW. The section presents two examples of discriminatory penal provisions, namely:
adultery and the honor killing.

40

IV.

Resolving the Trilemma

This Chapter presents a methodology for the resolution of the trilemma. The first section breaks down
the trilemma into two tasks: (i) assessing the legal force of ratified treaties versus non-compliant laws,
and (ii) interpreting Shari’a law reservations under the Constitution of 2014. The second section
responds to these tasks through the interpretation to the regulating provisions of the trilemma.
A.

Dismantling the Trilemma

When the trilemma arises, the competent court should: (a) decide over the conflict between the invoked
human rights instrument and the non-compliant law; and where the instrument is found to overrule the
non-compliant law, (b) ascertain that application of the human rights instrument is consistent with the
rulings of Shari’a law. In fulfilling these two tasks, the competent court should premise its verdict upon
the relative constitutional provisions. However, the reading of such provisions brings about a
magnitude of ambiguity, as shall be further discussed in the following two subsections.
1.
Shall Ratified Human Rights Instruments “Have the Force of Law”189 or
Supersede It?
The Egyptian Constitutions have traditionally regulated the enforcement of ratified treaties in Article
151.190 This Article confers the force of law upon treaties which are ratified and published in the
Official Gazette. As per this article, ratified treaties have the force of law, but they do not supersede
the law. Thus, the Article does not deal with the situation when the treaty and a law is contradictory
since both are equally enforceable.
Similar to Article 151, the Constitution of 2014 has introduced Article 93 as a specific rule to the
enforcement of ratified human rights instruments. The Article binds the state with those instruments
and confers upon them the force of law.191 However, the Article does not provide an explicit resolution
of the conflict between those instruments and laws.
At a first glance, the reading of Article 93 poses multiple questions with regards to its denotations and
instances. One can argue that the application of ratified human rights instruments prevails over non-
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compliant laws. Such an argument is premised on the obligation imposed by the Article upon the state
to enforce human rights instruments.192 As an elaboration, the competent court, as part of the state, is
obliged to uphold the application of ratified human rights instruments. Hence, the competent court
should overrule the application of such instruments over any non-compliant law. On the other hand,
one can argue that the provision of the Article is not much different than Article 151 based on the
indefinitive reference to the term “the state” and for the explicit wording that such instruments “have
the force of law;”193 thus not superior to the law. The ambiguity of this Article can be relied on to
reinforce both arguments. Furthermore, the Article confers the force of law upon ratified human rights
instruments “in accordance with the prescribed conditions.”194 The reference to those conditions is
another ambiguity that the Article bears.
In sum, the Constitution has traditionally conferred the force of law upon ratified and published
treaties. In addition, the Constitution of 2014 has introduced a specific Article for the enforcement of
human rights instruments. However, the conflict between ratified instruments and non-compliant laws
is not resolved by a constitutional provision.
2.
The Interpretation of Shari’a Law Reservation and the Constitutional
Interpretation of the Rulings of Shari’a Law
The second difficulty that the competent court encounters in resolving the trilemma is to articulate an
interpretation of Shari’a law reservations. These reservations halt the application of the ratified
instrument if it is not compatible with the rulings of Shari’a law. The competent court should, hence,
apply a compatibility test between the provisions of the invoked instrument against the rulings of
Shari’a law. However, the massive breadth and multiplicity of Islamic jurisprudence complicates the
conduct of such test.195
Nevertheless, the competent court may cite the interpretation of rulings of Shari’a law as coined by
the SCC.196 With reference to the second Article of the Constitution which designates the rulings of
Shari’a law as the main source of legislation,197 the SCC confined the reference of those rulings to the
ones which are “absolutely certain with respect to both their authenticity and meaning.”198
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Accordingly, one can argue that the competent court is obliged to follow the SCC in interpreting
Shari’a law reservations. Nonetheless, one can also argue that the SCC interpretation is in reference
to the constitutional designation of Shari’a law as the main source of legislation; thus, it is not binding
over the competent court to follow it in interpreting Shari’a law reservations.199
Defining the obligation of the competent court to follow the SCC in interpreting Shari’a law
reservation plays a crucial role in the resolution of the trilemma. If, arguendo, the competent court is
obliged to follow the SCC, then ratified human rights instruments will only be halted if they violate a
ruling of Shari’a law which is absolute in terms of its authenticity and meaning. If, however, the
competent court is not obliged to follow the SCC, the application of the ratified human rights
instrument can be halted, at the discretion of the court, when it violates any ruling of Shari’a law
irrespective of the authenticity of such a ruling.
B.

Interpreting the Trilemma

Reading the indefinitive terms of Article 93 along with Article 151 of the Constitution of 2014 provides
no clear answer to the question of supremacy between ratified human rights treaties and non-compliant
laws. likewise, the obligation of the competent court to follow the SCC in interpreting Shari’a law
reservation is debatable. As a result, the regulating rules of the trilemma should be examined in the
realm of legal interpretation. By that token, one can deduce the meaning of those provisions and follow
that meaning in the resolution of the trilemma.
The purpose of this subsection is to examine the regulating provisions of the trilemma in order to grasp
the meaning of their terms. The first part presents the methods of legal interpretation. The second part
investigates the obligation of the competent court to prevail the application of ratified human rights
instrument over non-compliant laws under the terms of Article 93. The third part argues that the
competent court is obliged to follow the SCC in the interpretation of Shari’a law reservations.
1.

Canons of Interpretation

The statutory text should be sufficiently clear in order to determine its “plain meaning.”200 The statute
is not clear when “it is open to two or more constructions, or where it is of such obscure or doubtful
meaning that reasonable minds might disagree or be uncertain as to its meaning.”201 The determinacy
of the statutory text is crucial to the judicial decision making. When the terms of the text are clear,
The obligation of the competent court to follow the SCC interpretation of Shari’a law in interpreting Shari’a law
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courts effortlessly apply the rule with no discretion in interpreting it. However, the language of the
statutes commonly leaves a magnitude of uncertainty within it.202 H.L.A Hart claims that language, in
general, is inherently limited in its capability to provide guidance.203 For example, a rule that forbids
any individual from taking a vehicle into a public park.204 This rule clearly applies to automobiles;
however, questions can be raised about the application of this rule to bicycles, roller skates, toy
automobiles, or even aeroplane.205 Hart theorizes that the statutes have a core meaning which is
surrounded by “a penumbra of uncertainty.”206 Against any vagueness or ambiguity that a statutory
text may cast, the resort to the canons of interpretation is unavoidable. Judges use those canons in order
to dig beyond the wording of the statute in order to grasp its meaning. Those canons form the legal
science of statuary interpretation; hence, the process of interpretation must be conducted with their
accordance.
In interpreting a statute, emphasis should be primarily given to the text itself.207 If the statute is
sufficiently clear in its wording, judges should not attempt to interpret the text. When, however, the
wording of the statute bears uncertainty or ambiguity, judges should find its meaning through the
interpretation of the text.208 Textual interpretation analyzes the literal meaning of the words, terms,
and statements of the ambiguous text in an attempt to grasp its meaning. However, the wording of
statues might be open to several interpretations. In that event, judges should analyze the text in
alignment with the rest of the statute. By that token, the meaning of the ambiguous text could appear
within the framework prescribed in the whole statute. If the text is, nonetheless, ambiguous, judges
should find the purpose of the legislature through investigating the travaux préparatoires of the statute
and interpret the meaning of the ambiguous text in accordance with the legislative purpose.209
In common law countries, some codified cannons guide the process of statuary interpretation.210 For
example, expressio unius est exclusion alterius dictates that the inclusion of one thing indicates the
202
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exclusion of others. Likewise, noscitur a sociis infers that an ambiguous word is better understood in
alignment with other words grouped in the same statute.211 Moreover, in pari materia suggests that an
ambiguous statue is better understood in alignment with other statues.212 More importantly, the rule
against surplusage directs the interpreters to avoid formulating interpretations that would render other
provisions of the statute superfluous or redundant.213
Similar to the content of the rule against surplusage, Egypt and other Arab countries regard the
legislature as immune to redundancy and superfluity. This perception has been voiced in multiple
judgments in Egypt and other Arab courts.214 Hence, the interpretation of an ambiguous statutory text
should not render other provisions of the statute redundant or unnecessary.
2.

“The State Shall Be Bound,” but Shall be the Competent Court?

At a first glance, the reading of Articles 93 and 151 of the Constitution of 2014 does not resolve the
conflict between ratified treaties, and laws. However, the synthesis of both Articles can be argued to
confer supremacy on the judicial application of ratified human rights instruments over non-compliant
laws. Such an argument can be premised on the textual, contextual, and purposive understanding of
the articles.
Prior to putting the terms of the Articles under the scrutiny of interpretation, it is of primary importance
to point out the differences between these two Articles.215
Article 151 vests upon the president the power to sign international treaties and ratify them upon the
approval of the parliament. The Article confers the force of law upon such treaties after their
publication in the Official Gazette.216 In contrast, Article 93 binds the state with the ratified human
rights agreements, covenants, and conventions. Such instruments are given the force of law upon their
publication. Accordingly, both Articles regulate the enforcement of international instruments, and both
Articles confer the force of law upon these treaties. However, in addition to the obvious difference that
Article 93 is confined to human rights instruments, it bears three other differences: (i) whereas Article
151 only mentions treaties, Article 93 mentions agreements, covenants, and conventions; (ii) Article
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151 requires the approval of the parliament as a prerequisite for the ratification of a treaty while Article
93 does not require such prerequisite; and (iii) in addition to conferring the force of law upon human
rights instruments, Article 93 binds the state with those instruments. For the purpose of solving the
questing of supremacy between the ratified treaties and laws, the terms of the third difference will be
textually, contextually, and purposively analyzed below.
a)

The Textual Interpretation

The interpretation of the term “the state” mentioned in Article 93 has a significant impact on the
question of supremacy between ratified human rights instruments, and laws. If, arguendo, the reference
of the term “the state” extends to apply to all state authorities, then the judiciary as well as the SCC
are bound by the ratified human rights instruments.
Before the Constitution of 2014, the SCC found that the application of non-compliant laws over ratified
human rights instruments is not a constitutional violation;217 however, such a dictum can be argued to
be unacceptable under the Constitution of 2014. As per Article 93, ratified human rights instruments
not only possess the force of law, but they are also binding upon courts to apply. Therefore, courts are
obliged to uphold the application of ratified human rights instruments in spite of any non-compliant
laws.
The obligation of the judiciary to prevail the application of ratified human rights treaties over noncompliant law is premised on the theorized interpretation of Article 93 that extends the reference of
the term “the state” to the judiciary. In order to investigate the validity of this interpretation, the term
“the state” should be textually interpreted.
On the international level, various definitions have been articulated for the term “the state.”218 These
definitions have listed three main elements for the recognition of a state, namely: people, a defined
territory, and a supreme authority.219 However, the term “the state” on a domestic level refers to the
authorities, or powers, of the state. In Egypt, there are three main state powers: (i) the legislative power
(the parliament), (ii) the executive power (the government), and (iii) the judiciary (the courts). Those
powers are numerated respectively in chapter 1, 2, and 3 under part (V) of the Constitution of 2014.
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Therefore, the term “the state” can be argued to apply to the judiciary. The competent court, as part of
the judiciary, is thus bound by ratified human rights instruments and should uphold their application
over non-compliant laws.
b)

The Contextual Interpretation

The phraseology of Article 93 as well as the Preamble of the Constitution suggests the supremacy of
the application of ratified human rights instruments over non-complaint laws.
On the one hand, if the legislature is immune to redundancy and superfluity,220 then Article 93 must
not be mere replication of the traditional provision of Article 151. If the latter confers the force of law
upon all kinds of ratified treaties, it would be redundant to draft Article 93 which likewise only confers
the force of law upon ratified human rights instruments. As a result, Article 93 must be interpreted in
a way that does not render the traditional provision of Article 151 as unnecessary. In attempting to
grasp that meaning, light should be shed on the inclusion of the statement “the state shall be bound” in
addition to conferring the force of law on ratified human rights instruments. Moreover, Article 93 is
listed under Part IV of the Constitution of 2014. This part outlines the freedoms and rights of citizens.
Therefore, one can deduce that those instruments have the force of law; in addition, the competent
court is bound to enforce those instruments over non-compliant laws in cases of contradictions.
On the other hand, the reading of Article 93 in alignment with the rest of the Constitution highlights
the unprecedented attention the Constitution of 2014 draws to human rights. This attention can be seen
in different areas of the Constitution. The preamble of the constitution states: “We are drafting a
Constitution that paves the way to the future for us, and which is consistent with the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights which we participated in drafting and adopted.”221 Article 5 regards the
respect for human rights as a main pillar of the Egyptian political system.222 In addition, the
Constitution recognizes human rights councils and guarantees their independence.223 Moreover, the
Constitution regards any violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution as a crime
which does not abate by laps of time.224 The Constitution also binds universities to teach the values of
human rights in all academic disciplines.225 The reading of Article 93 should be situated within the
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constitutional tendency to elevate human rights in Egypt. Therefore, it can be argued that the
framework of the present Constitution suggests supremacy to the application of ratified human rights
instruments over non-compliant laws.
c)

The Purposive Interpretation

The legislative purpose of Article 93 is to be located in the travaux préparatoires of the Constitution
of 2014. Before exploring these travaux préparatoires, it’s important to shed light on how the
Constitution of 2014 came into being. The commencement of drafting the Constitution was initiated
by virtue of Presidential Decree No. 489 of Year. 2013 which formed a ten-member Committee to
revise the provisions of the revoked Constitution of 2012 and make recommendations for the drafting
of the new Constitution.226 Based on the recommendations of the ten-member Committee, Presidential
Decree No. 570 of Year 2013 formed another fifty-member Committee and assigned it to the task of
drafting the Constitution of 2014.227 The committee held 63 meetings in the last of which it presented
the final draft of the suggested provisions. The phraseology of the draft was subsequently revised by
an expert committee. Then, the draft was finally offered for public referendum on January 14 and 15
2014.228 The results of the referendum was announced on January 18th, 2014 showing 98.1% had voted
for the constitution.229
In revealing the legislative purpose of Article 93, recourse should be made to the minutes of the
meetings held by the fifty-member committee which drafted the provisions of the Constitution.230 In
the first few meetings, the members of the committee gave introductory speeches expressing their
aspiration about the work and held general discussions. In the following meetings, the members formed
subcommittees such as: State and Basic Pillars Subcommittee, Rights and Freedoms Subcommittee,
and Social Communication Subcommittee. Each Subcommittee proposed provisions to be included in
the constitutional draft; after such proposals were discussed, they were referred to voting.
In the introductory speeches of the members, the enforcement of human rights was abundantly echoed.
Among the words of the introductory speeches made in the fifth meeting, international human rights
instruments were cited as a binding reference for the political, civil, economic, and social rights that

226

The procedures of the drafting of the constitution of 2014 at Supra note 207 Page 277.
See Id. at Page 280.
228
See Id. at page 292.
229
See Id.
230
The minutes of the 63 meetings held by the fifty-member committee are available at: https://manshurat.org [accessed
23 February 2018].
227

48

the constitution will express.231 In a similar view, it has been said that: “Regarding international
obligations imposed on Egypt, especially those related to human rights, it is important for this
Constitution to confirm that every national deserves all human rights akin to developed countries; thus,
we must assure that obligations of human rights instruments are binding.”232 Likewise, another
introductory speech claimed that the practice of rights should not be subject to the provisions of law
“I wrote that the constitution usually, and specially with regards to rights and freedoms, mentions the
statement of “as prescribed by law.” … Sadly, this statement was being abused by arbitral governments
to limit rights and freedoms.”233 In addition, the Chair of Rights and Freedoms Subcommittee, in her
introductory speech: “we discussed the necessity to include an explicit provision that confirms the
binding nature of ratified human rights treaties.”234 Moreover, Pastor El Biady suggested: “Why cannot
we regard international treaties and agreements as a main part of the political system. Not the treaties
which have been signed or ratified but those treaties which have been approved by the parliament
should be a source of legislation.”235 Most importantly, the introductory speech made by Mrs. Mourad
in which she stated that:
There are certain general principles that we must adhere to in drafting
the constitution. I will focus on two principles. The first is the respect of
the human rights treaties and its obligation. Thus, the constitution must
clearly stipulate that no law, decree, regulation should violate the
UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR, The Declaration of The Right to Develop,
labour rights related treaties, and women’s rights, and CEDAW...”236
Based on these introductory speeches, it could be argued that the drafters of the Constitution had the
intent to reinforce the application of ratified human rights instruments.
The provision of Article 93 was proposed in the nineteenth meeting of the fifty-member Committee.237
The proposal came from State and Basic Pillars Subcommittee as a novel Article.238 The text read:
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“The state shall be bound by the rights and freedoms stipulated in human rights agreements, covenants
and conventions which Egypt ratifies.”239 Upon reading the text, it was hotly debated by the members
invoking the ambiguity which this Article bears. Some members theorized that the instance of this
Article is identical to the traditional provision of Article 151 and thus redundant; others found the
difference in the language of the text that details agreements, covenants, and conventions whereas
Article 151 only mentions treaties. Other members endorsed the text because the inclusion of such an
Article in the Constitution would elevate how Egypt is pictured on the international level. Against the
multiplicity of views raised by the members regarding this text, emphasis should be given to the
comment raised Mrs. El Telawy criticizing the status of human rights fulfillment in the last political
era. In the wording of her comment, she stated that:
First, I want to say that the inclusion of this Article in the constitution is
very necessary. Why? Because the previous government wanted to
conceal that reference (the reference to the enforcement of ratified
international treaties)240 so as to revoke any social laws which have been
enacted under that reference… you are saying that Egypt already
complies with the obligations of international instruments. In fact, Egypt
does not…. This can be seen in the human rights reports about Egypt
which raise numerous allegations against Egypt because it signs the
treaty, but it does not comply with the obligations of it.241
To a similar sense, Mr. El Naggar justified his endorsement to this text by stating that:
[t]his text benefits the people, and we represent the people in claiming
their rights. The text binds the state with the rights and freedoms, and
we should assure more rights and freedoms to the people. If this text
does not grant the people with more rights and freedoms recognized by
the international community, it, at least, equalize the people with the
international community.242
The question about the legal force of ratified human rights instruments and their position in the
hierarchy of legality was posed by Mr. Abd El Salam. He questioned if, based on this text, ratified
human rights instruments should have the legal force of the constitution, and thus trump any noncompliant law.243 The responses made to that question did not give a clear answer. Many responses
held that ratified human rights instruments do not possess the legal force of the constitution. Other
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responses supported that Egypt must be obliged by ratified human rights instruments. The text was
finally referred to voting and passed by 80% of the members.244
The examination of the travaux préparatoires does not provide an explicit answer to the question of
supremacy between the application of ratified human rights instruments and non-compliant laws.
However, one can point out multiple statements that showed rejection of the non-enforcement of
ratified human rights instruments on the domestic level, and other comments attempted to secure as
many freedoms and rights as possible for the Egyptian people. Although some of these comments were
contested by other members, the text eventually passed by 80% of the members who voted for it.245
Upon the textual, contextual, and purposive interpretation of the terms of Article 93, it could be argued
that the Constitution of 2014 opens the door for further judicial application of human rights
instruments. However, this finding can be countered by other interpretation that can be derived from
the ambiguous terms of the Article.
3.

The Interpretation of SCC is Binding on The Competent Court

The interpretation of Shari’a law reservations should not be left to the discretionary power of the
competent court. Rather, the latter should follow the interpretation articulated by the SCC in defining
the rulings of Shari’a law.246
The SCC has found that reference to the rulings of Shari’a law is confined to the ones which are
absolutely certain with respect to their authenticity and meaning.247 Nonetheless, The Administrative
Court has formulated broader interpretations of Shari’a law reservations formulated to ratified human
rights instruments. This subsection argues that the competent court should follow the SCC in the
interpretation of Shari’a law reservation. The argument is chiefly premised on the constitutional and
legislative provisions regulating the powers of the SCC.
The Constitution of 2014 regulates the powers of the SCC in the fourth chapter of Part (V). Article
192 outlines the powers of the court as follows: “The Supreme Constitutional Court shall be solely
competent to decide on the constitutionality of laws and regulations, to interpret legislative
provisions…”248 Following the terms of this Article, the interpretation of legislative provisions should
be an exclusive power possessed by the SCC. As prescribed by the Constitution, ratified treaties should
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be examined by the parliament, and their approval should be published in the Official Gazette;249 thus,
the treaty becomes a legislative instrument. Whereas interpreting legislative provisions is exclusively
in the hand of the SCC, therefore the competent court should follow the legislative interpretation
articulated by the SCC.
The judgments of the SCC are of absolute authority. Article 195 of the Constitution of 2014 reads:
“The judgments and decisions issued by the Supreme Constitutional Court shall be published in the
Official Gazette, and they shall be binding upon everyone and all of the State authorities. They shall
have Res judicata vis-à-vis all of them.”250 Therefore, courts are constitutionally obliged to adhere to
the decisions and judgments ruled by the SCC.
The interpretations of the SCC are also of binding nature. Article 49 of the Law of the SCC reads:
“The court judgements and interpretations are binding to all state authorities and to all.”251 Therefore,
not only are courts obliged to adhere to the judgements ruled by the SCC, the interpretations made
thereby are also not to be altered by any court.
With relations to the Second Article of the Constitution which has traditionally designated the rulings
of Shari’a law as the main source of legislation,252 the SCC has found that the reference to those rulings
is confined to the ones which are “absolutely certain in terms of their authenticity and meaning.”253 In
this judgement, the SCC differentiated between the rulings which are directly driven from a divine
source and whose meaning is undisputedly clear, and the rulings which are deduced by the intellectual
process of Ijtihad.254 The court found that the interpretation of Shari’a law should be confined to the
first category of rules.255
With this being said, the competent court should follow the SCC in interpreting Shari’a law reservation
formulated to ratified human rights instruments. The ratified instrument, with the reservation
formulated thereto, is a legislative instrument based on its approval by the parliament. Whereas the
interpretation of legislative provisions is one of the judicial task which the SCC solely possesses, the
competent court should not use its discretion in defining Shari’a law reservation formulated to the
treaty.
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Moreover, based on the absolute authority of the judgements and interpretations of the SCC,256 the
competent court is obliged to adhere to the interpretation of Shari’a law as articulated by the SCC.257
This obligation is crystalized by the preamble of the Constitution of 2014 which states: “We are
drafting a Constitution that affirms that the principles of Islamic Sharia are the principal source of
legislation, and that the reference for the interpretation of such principles lies in the body of the relevant
Supreme Constitutional Court Rulings.”258 As a result, the competent court should not use its discretion
to interpret Shari’a law reservation formulated to international treaties.
Nevertheless, the SCC interpretation was made to Shari’a law as the main source of interpretation, and
not as a reservation formulated to a treaty. As a result, the obligation of the competent court to follow
such interpretation with regards to Shari’a law reservation can be contested because the competent
court is only obliged to follow it in the same context. However, this contention can be countered by
two arguments. Firstly, the unity of the theme of the second Article of the Constitution and the
reservation makes the obligation of the competent court plausible. As an elaboration, the content of
the second Article as well as the reservation is Shari’a law; if the latter has been interpreted by the
SCC, such interpretation is binding upon other courts. Secondly, the power to interpret legislative
provisions is exclusively conferred to the SCC; as a result, if the competent court should not articulate
a different definition to Shari’a law reservation and should follow insofar the interpretations made by
the SCC.
C.

Deciding the trilemma

Based on the theorized finding of the last two sections, the judicial application of ratified human rights
instruments should prevail over any non-compliant law. Such instruments should only be halted if
found inconsistent with the rulings of Shari’a law as interpreted by the SCC. This section briefly
applies these finding of the discussed trilemma cases of apostasy and labour strike.259
The Egyptian Administrative Court has dismissed the request to notarize conversion from Islam.260
The case was filed by an apostate who faced rejection from the Civil Status Department to notarize
conversion from Islam to Christianity. The plaintiff ‘s request was, among other grounds, premised on
Egypt’s obligation to guarantee freedom of religion as prescribed in the ICCPR. The Court reviewed
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the case and found that apostasy is incompatible with the rulings of Shari’a law; thus, the court struck
down Egypt’s obligation towards the ICCPR by virtue of Shari’a law reservation formulated thereto.261
The finding of this judgment is justified by some views in the Islamic jurisprudence that regards
apostasy as a great sin that is punishable by the death penalty.262 However, other Islamic jurisprudential
schools contest the existence of a corporal punishment for apostasy. Those views stress on the nonbinding character of Islam; they suggest that Non-Muslims cannot be compelled to follow Islam, and
Muslims should not be compelled to remain Muslims.263 As a result, the prohibition of apostasy is not
one of the rulings of Shari’a law which are absolute in terms of their authenticity and meaning.
Whereas the SCC interpretation of Shari’a law is confined to these rulings, the Administrative Court
should, thus, only halt the application of ratified human rights instruments based on violating one of
these rulings. Therefore, notarization of conversion from Islam should not be withheld because of
Shari’a prohibition.
Similarly, the Egyptian Administrative Court held the illegality of labor strike and applied penalties
upon its doers.264 Although the strikers’ defense relied on Egypt’s obligation to guarantee the legality
of labor strike as prescribed by the ICESCR, the court rejected the defense and found them guilty. The
court reasoned its judgment upon the prohibition of strike in the Islamic jurisprudence.265 Nevertheless,
the theorization of such prohibition is by far not one of the rulings which are absolute in terms of their
authenticity and meaning.266 As a result, the application of the ICESCR should not be halted thereof.
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V.

Conclusion

The trilemma arises when a ratified human rights instrument is invoked against the application of a
non-compliant law. In this situation, the competent court encounters two inconsistent legal
instruments, namely the non-compliant law and the treaty. Similar to laws, ratified treaties are legally
enforceable instruments.267 As a result, those instruments are to be judicially applied akin to laws.
However, the situation is perplexing due to the conflict between the two instruments. In resolving this
conflict, the competent court will inevitably use its discretion to place one instrument over the other,
but such decision should be premised on a constitutional or a legal ground. In this regard, no clear
constitutional or legislative provision deals with the situation. As a result, a previous judgement has
attempted to resolve the conflict based on the rule of “lex posterior derogat legi priori”268 i.e. the
subsequent instrument renders the earlier instrument inoperative. Although the latter judgement
presents a plausible way of resolving the inconsistency between legal instruments, the SCC held that
the application of a non-compliant law in spite of ratified instrument is not a constitutional violation
because “[t]hose treaties hold the legal force of laws, yet they do not supersede laws.” 269 Against this
absence of legislative guidance or determinate judicial practice, the resolution of the conflict remains
a conundrum to the competent court.
In addition to the difficulty of resolving the conflict between the application ratified instruments and
laws, the interpretation of Shari’a law reservation constitutes another legal difficulty for competent
court. Egypt has formulated Shari’a law reservations to numerous human rights instruments; thus, the
application of those instruments is halted in cases of incompatibility with the rulings of Shari’a law.
Hence, before the ratified instrument is judicially implemented, its compatibility with the rulings of
Shari’a law should be ascertained. However, the compatibility assessment between the treaty and the
rulings of Shari’a law is confounded due to the multiplicity and indeterminacy of Shari’a law
jurisprudence.270 Although, the SCC has narrowed the reference of Shari’a law to the rules which are
“absolutely certain with respect to both their authenticity and meaning,”271 the Administrative Courts
articulated broader definition of Shari’a law.
Against this backdrop, the Egyptian Administrative Court struck down obligations of ratified human
rights instruments based on the broad interpretation of Shari’a law. For example, the Court revoked
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Egypt’s obligation to guarantee freedom of religion based on the Islamic prohibition of apostasy.
Likewise, The Court renounced Egypt’s obligation to guarantee the legality of labor strike on the basis
of Islamic prohibition.
This judicial assassination of ratified human rights instruments can be attributed to two main reason:
(i) the absence of any legislative or judicial guidance for resolving the conflict between ratified human
rights instruments and laws, and (ii) the difficulty of interpreting Shari’a law reservations. Because of
these two reasons, the competent court, by its own discretionary, decides the conflict.
Moreover, the EPC embodies numerous provisions which constitute discrimination against women.
Since Egypt is a signatory member to CEDAW, then Egypt has undertaken to repeal those provisions.
As a result, CEDAW as an enforceable legal instrument can be invoked against the application of those
penal provisions.
Nonetheless, this paper argues that the application of ratified human rights instruments is superior to
any non-compliant law. The argument of this paper is chiefly premised on novel provisions of Article
93 of the constitution of 2014. In addition to the traditional provision of Article 151 of the Constitution
which confers the force of law over ratified treaties, Article 93 binds the state with ratified human
rights instruments. The term “the state” refers to the authorities of the state; thereby, it extends to the
judiciary and all courts. Furthermore, Article 93 should be situated within the unprecedented attention
to respect and protect human rights in the Constitution of 2014. Thus, ratified treaties not only have
the force of law, but their application is binding upon courts in spite of any non-compliant law.
With relation to the interpretation of Shari’a law reservation, the paper argues that the competent court
should follow the SCC’s interpretation of the rulings of Shari’a law. Based on the absolute authority
of the judgements and interpretations made by the SCC, the competent court should not use its
discretion in interpreting Shari’a law. Rather, the competent court should assess the compatibility
between the ratified instrument and the rulings of Shari’a law according to the interpretation of Shari’a
law articulated by the SCC. The latter found that the reference to the rulings of Shari’a law is confined
to the rules which are absolute in terms of their authenticity and meaning. Thus, the competent court
should only halt the application of ratified human rights instruments when they are inconsistent with
those absolute rulings.
The paper suggests that the Constitution of 2014 presents a resolution of the trilemma. Following the
two arguments presented herein, domestic courts should give supremacy to the application of ratified
human rights instruments over any non-compliant law. However, when the ratification of those
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instruments embodies a Shari’a law reservation, domestic courts should only halt those instruments if
they violate the rulings of Shari’a law which are absolute in their authenticity and meaning.
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